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Chapter 1
Introduction
Software Defined Networking (SDN) is revolutionizing the networking indus-
try by enabling programmability, easier management and faster innovation.
These benefits are made possible by its centralized control plane architec-
ture, which allows the network to be programmed by the application and
controlled from one central entity. The SDN architecture is composed of
both switches/routers and a central controller (SDN controller). The SDN
device processes and delivers packets according to rules stored in its flow ta-
ble (forwarding state), whereas the SDN controller configures the forwarding
state of each switch using a standard way: OpenFlow (OF). The controller is
also responsible to build the virtual topology representing the physical one.
Virtual topology is used by application modules that run on top of the SDN
controller to implement different control logics and network functions (e.g.,
routing, traffic engineering, firewall state).
Currently Quality of Service (QoS) management in OpenFlow is limited:
in each OF switch one or more queues can be configured for each outgoing
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interface and used to map flow entries on them. Flow entries assigned to a
specific queue will be treated according to the queue’s configuration in terms
of service rate, but queue configuration takes place outside the OpenFlow
protocol [1]. Without a proper rate assignment, it is difficult to guarantee
QoS requirements to traffic. A possible solution to limit performance degra-
dation involves the re-routing of the flow undergoing the violation of QoS
constraints on a less congested path or queue.
Satellite communication networks have been evolving from standalone
networks with ad-hoc infrastructures to possibly interconnected portions of a
wider Future Internet architecture. Experts belonging to the fifth-generation
(5G) standardization committees are considering satellites as a technology
to integrate in the 5G environment. SDN is one of the paradigms of the next
generation of mobile and fixed communications. It can be employed to per-
form different control functionalities, such as routing, because it allows traffic
flow identification based on different parameters and traffic flow management
in a centralized way. The problem is to individuate a possible SDN-based
satellite - terrestrial network architecture and understand if the classical way
of management of this type of network (using OpenFlow) is feasible.
Many infrastructures and services are based on the use of Internet. The
number of people that has access to an Internet connection is growing rapidly.
These facts lead, on one hand, to new possible threats and attacks used by
cyber criminals, and, on the other hand, to an increased complexity in the
management. It is crucial to design systems able to prevent and tackle cy-
ber attacks such as Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) that can alert when
someone or something is trying or has tried to compromise information sys-
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tems through malicious actions. In the same time, big efforts are provided
in order to get tools that can make easier network management. The SDN
paradigm has been designed with this aim and allows network administrators
to manage networks by abstracting functionalities through the separation of
data and control planes.
In this thesis we try to study how SDN can be employed in order to
support Quality of Service and how the support of this functionality is fun-
damental for today networks. Considering, not only the present networks,
but also the next generation ones, the importance of the SDN paradigm
become manifest as the use of satellite networks, which can be useful consid-
ering their broadcasting capabilities. For these reasons, this research focuses
its attention on satellite - terrestrial networks and in particular on the use
of SDN inside this environment. As mentioned before, the growing of the
information technologies has pave the way for new possible threats. This
research study tries to cover also this problem considering how SDN can be
employed for the detection of past and future malware inside networks.
The outcomes of this thesis are manifold, and in particular can be ex-
pressed as:
Theoretical Develop a theoretical framework able to map topology, QoS
requirements and traffic descriptors into actions that must be taken
in order to provide better Quality of Service and guarantee certain se-
curity level inside a network. Describe the next generation satellite
networks trying to understand what are the problems of the current
generation and provide possible solutions and a possible road-map in
order to effectively implement the SDN paradigm in a satellite - terres-
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trial network.
Algorithm design Design of algorithms and routines that, given the status
of the network, can generate network-level directives (i.e. flow modifi-
cations in OpenFlow) for the devices in the network in order to manage
the overall Quality of Service but also can stop malicious traffic that is
traversing the network.
Implementation Implementation of a QoS module and a security module
inside an SDN controller: the controller will implement the solutions
carried out in the theoretical and algorithm design objectives. The
implemented controller will be tested through simulated/emulated sce-
narios in order to evaluate performance issues and scalability concerns.
The studies made during my Ph.D. on these problems allow me to create
two SDN controller prototypes module, which are dedicated to the quality of
service and to network security respectively. The first module is responsible
for collecting traffic statistics from the underling network, monitoring the
queues of SDN switches and re-route flows in case of traffic overloading. In
the second one, thanks to the collection of statistics developed for the first
module and with simple computations, the security aware controller module
can distinguish in real time if a traffic flow is affected by malware or not.
Another fundamental part of my research activity is dedicated to the use of
SDN technology in the satellite environment. One of the aims of my research
is to introduce an SDN-based terrestrial satellite network architecture and
to estimate the mean time to deliver the data of a new traffic flow from the
source to the destination including the time required to transfer SDN control
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actions. The practical effect is to identify the maximum performance than
can be expected in this type of network.
Software Defined Networking is a matter of high interest for the academic
research area since it can provide answers to one of the main problem of the
networking: portability. In the traditional approach to networking, most net-
work functionalities are implemented in routers and switches with dedicated
hardware but this approach is characterized by slow evolution of network
functionalities. As the traditional networking paradigm has a rather static
nature and now there is a widespread adoption of server virtualization and
a pressure for network organizations to be more efficient and agile in net-
work management, the necessity of a new software-oriented approach starts
to arise. One of the main solutions that fulfill the aforementioned need is
Software Defined Networking. SDN is highly beneficial for what concerns the
QoS, Security and satellite worlds.
The thesis is organized as follows: Chapter 2 describes the SDN paradigm
and its main components. Chapter 3 introduces the concepts of Quality of
Service and how it is handled inside traditional and SDN-based networks.
Chapter 4 shows the use of SDN inside the satellite environments and tries to
understand limitations and solutions that can be applied to this environment.
Chapter 5 describes the problem of network security with particular interest
in the use of intrusion detection systems. Chapter 6 describes the use of
an SDN architecture as an intrusion detection systems able to identify the




In the traditional approach to networking, most network functionality is im-
plemented in a dedicated appliance such as switch, router, application de-
livery controller. In addition, within the dedicated appliance, most of the
functionality is implemented in dedicated hardware such as an ASIC (Appli-
cation Specific Integrated Circuit).
This kind of approach is characterized by slow evolution of network function-
alities, which are by the way under the control of the provider of the device.
The widespread adoption of server virtualization and the consequent need
to move virtual machines dynamically between servers lead to increasing
pressure for network organizations to be more efficient and agile in network
management. As the traditional networking paradigm has a rather static
nature, the need for a new software-oriented approach started to arise.
One of the main innovations that the software-based approach can in-
troduce is the concept of abstractions applied to the control plane. The
abstractions in the data plane are already well established: the use of the
16
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protocol stack is well standardized in any networking application. We need
to define some abstractions useful to create reusable components also for the
control plane [2]. The main tasks that the control plane must take care of
are:
• Figuring out the topology of the network
• Computing how to accomplish its goal on the given topology
• Configuring the forwarding state
Till now, each new control protocol must solve all three issues. In order
to create components that can be reused, it is possible to abstract the two
main tasks related to the topology information and the forwarding state
configuration. These two issues are identified by:
Global Network View It provides information about all the topology ar-
chitecture related to the considered network. This abstraction is in-
tended to translate the real network structure into a graph that the
controller can analyze in order to compute the forwarding model. The
global network view is provided by the Network Operating System
(NOS), which is an implementation of this abstraction lying above the
data plane.
Forwarding Model It provides a standard way of defining the forwarding
state inside the network nodes. The implementation of this abstraction
consists in installing simple forwarding rules inside the SDN switches
that are part of the network. The nodes are then supposed to follow
these rules in order to forward the packets.
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The main innovation brought by Software Defined Networking is the de-
coupling of control and data plane [3]. In legacy networks, both control an
data plane are managed by the same entity, for example the router. This
concept creates a heavy burden for the device which has to take care of the
network. In Software Defined Networking the two tasks are assigned to dif-
ferent entities: the controller, which is the part of the network dedicated
to compute the forwarding state and the switch, which is the node devoted
to packet forwarding based on the local forwarding state. This difference is






















Figure 2.1: Difference between a traditional network 2.1(a) and a SDN net-
work 2.1(b).
The main elements constituting a Software Defined Network are [4]:
• Control Program - It has to decide forwarding policy by knowledge
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of virtual global topology
• Network OS - It generates the virtual topology from the physical
network
• Routers/Switches - They implement specific rules to forward packets
The Software Defined Networking architecture has the aim of leaving the in-
telligence outside the data plane, in order to make the forwarding mechanisms
simpler and quicker. The control program can therefore be implemented in-
side a supervising Software Defined Networking controller together with the
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Figure 2.2: Difference between routing in a traditional network and a SDN
network.
The switches, on the other hand, send packets on the basis of simple
rules, installed inside the node by the above standing controller. These rules
are defined by match-action couples: a packet whose header corresponds to
certain parameters (a certain match) must be treated according to a specific
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policy (the action to be taken). Controller and switch interact together using
the forwarding model, whose main implementation is the OpenFlow Protocol
[1].
The main opportunities that Software Defined Networking can address
are the support of dynamic movement and allocation of network resources,
the scalability of network functionalities and the reduction of network com-
plexity.
Software Defined Networking allows also to perform traffic engineering with
an end-to-end view of the network and to apply more effective security func-
tionalities [3].
The Open Networking Fundation (ONF) is the group that is most as-
sociated with the development and standardization of SDN . According to
the ONF, Software Defined Networking is an emerging architecture that is
dynamic, manageable, cost-effective, and adaptable, making it ideal for the
high-bandwidth, dynamic nature of today’s applications [5].
The main characteristics of the Software Defined Networking architecture
are:
• Programmability - Network control is directly programmable because
it is decoupled from forwarding functions
• Agility - Abstracting control from forwarding lets administrators dy-
namically adjust network-wide traffic flow to meet changing needs
• Central Management - Network intelligence is (logically) centralized in
software-based Software Defined Networking controllers that maintain
a global view of the network, which appears to applications and policy
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engines as a single, logical switch
• Programmatical Configuration - Software Defined Networking lets net-
work managers configure, manage, secure, and optimize network re-
sources very quickly via dynamic, automated Software Defined Net-
working programs, which they can write themselves because the pro-
grams do not depend on proprietary software
• Use of open standard - When implemented through open standards,
Software Defined Networking simplifies network design and operation
because instructions are provided by Software Defined Networking con-
trollers instead of multiple, vendor-specific devices and protocols
2.1 The SDN Controller
The decoupled system has been compared to an operating system [6], in which
the controller provides a programmatic interface to the network, and it can
be used to implement management tasks and offer new functionalities. This
abstraction assumes the control is centralized and applications are written as
if the network is a single system. It enables the Software Defined Networking
model to be applied over a wide range of applications and heterogeneous
network technologies and physical media such as wireless, wired and optical
networks.
The Software Defined Networking controller has a double functionality:
it needs to interact with the underlying network switches (Southbound Com-
munication), but it also has to interface with high-level applications (North-
bound Communication).
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While controller-switch interaction is fairly well defined in protocols such
as OpenFlow, there is no standard for interactions between controllers and
network services or applications. One possible explanation is that the north-
bound interface is defined entirely in software, while controller-switch inter-
actions must enable hardware implementation.
If we think of the controller as a “network operating system“, then there
should be a clearly defined interface by which applications can access the
underlying hardware (switches), co-exist and interact with other applications,
and utilize system services (e.g., topology discovery, forwarding), without
requiring the application developer to know the implementation details of
the controller. While there are several controllers that exist, their application
interfaces are still in the early stages and independent from each other. A
global overview of the current controller implementations can be found in
Table 2.1 [7].
2.2 The OpenFlow Protocol
OpenFlow [1] is a communication protocol that gives access to the forwarding
plane of a switch or router over the network. It takes care of the signalling
between the controller and the switches inside a Software Defined Networking
network.
OpenFlow enables remote controllers to establish the path of packets that
are travelling in the network, using network switches which are compliant to
the standard. OpenFlow in fact makes available a tool, the flow table, which
allows not only to perform routing operations, but also other functionalities,
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Controller Implementation Overview
POX Python General, open-source SDN controller.
NOX Python/C++ The first OpenFlow controller.
MUL C OpenFlow controller with a multi-threaded infrastructure that
supports a multi-level north-bound interface for applications.
Maestro Java A NOS that provides interfaces for implementing modular net-
work control applications.
Trema Ruby/C A framework for developing OpenFlow controllers.
Beacon Java A cross-platform, modular, OpenFlow controller that supports
event-based and threaded operations.
Jaxon Java An OpenFlow controller based on NOX.
Helios C An extensible OpenFlow controller that provides a program-
matic shell for performing integrated experiments.
Floodlight Java A controller based on Beacon, that works with physical- and
virtual- OpenFlow switches.
SNAC C++ An OpenFlow controller based on NOX, which manages the
network, configures devices, and monitors events.
Ryu Python An SDN operating system that provides logically centralized
control and APIs to create new network management and con-
trol applications.
NodeFlow JavaScript An OpenFlow controller for Node.JS
ovs-controller C A simple OpenFlow controller implementation with Open-
vSwitch for managing remote switches through the OF proto-
col.
Flowvisor C Special purpose controller implementation.
RouteFlow C++ Special purpose controller implementation.
ONOS Java Open Network Operating System (ONOS) is an (SDN) OS for
service providers.
Table 2.1: SDN controllers overview
such as implementing firewall, making NAT (Network Address Translation)
or implementing Quality of Service policies.
OpenFlow provides an open standard to program the flow table in different
switches and routers. With this tool a network administrator can easily
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manage a network, divide flows or perform other actions without the need of
hardware-specific tools but only using the OpenFlow primitives [8].
OpenFlow Protocol supports three message types: controller-to-switch,
asynchronous and symmetric, each with multiple subtypes. The first type
is used by the controller to manage or inspect the state of the switch. The
second type of message is used by OpenFlow switch for updating the infor-
mation the controller has about the network and the switch state. Symmetric
messages are sent either by the switch or the controller without solicitation.
There are different types of controller-to-switch messages:
• Feature: it is sent by the controller upon TLS (Transport Layer Secu-
rity) session establishment. The switch replies to this message with a
features reply that specifies the capabilities supported by the switch.
• Modify-state: this type of message is sent by the controller to manage
states on switches. Its primary purpose is to add/remove and modify
flows in the switch’s flow table.
• Read-state: this message is used by the controller to collect statistics
from the switch’s flow table, port and individual flow entries.
• Barrier : this request/reply message is used by the controller to receive
notifications for completed operations.
The asynchronous messages are sent by a switch without the controller’s
solicitation. The main type of asynchronous messages are:
• Packet-in: for all packets that do not have a matching flow entry in
the flow table a packet-in event is sent to the controller.
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• Flow-removed : this is a message sent to the controller if and only if the
controller in the modify-state event has set the corresponding flag.
• Errors : the switch is able to notify the controller of problems using
error messages.
The last type of messages is the symmetric ones:
• Hello: they are exchanged between the switch and the controller upon
connection start-up.
• Echo: echo request/reply messages can be sent form either the switch
or the controller and must return an echo reply. They can be used to
indicate the latency, bandwidth and/or liveness of a controller-switch
connection.
• Vendor : this type of message provides a standard way for OpenFlow
switches to offer additional functionalities within the OpenFlow mes-
sage type space.
Chapter 3
Quality of Service in
Traditional and SDN Networks
3.1 Definition of Quality of Service
Concerning the network viewpoint, QoS is the ability of a network element
to have some level of assurance that its traffic and service requirements can
be satisfied. QoS manages bandwidth according to application demands and
network management settings.
The term QoS is used in different meanings, ranging from the users’ per-
ception of the service to a set of connection parameters necessary to achieve
particular service quality. The QoS meaning changes depending on the ap-
plication field and on the scientific scope. Three types of Quality of Service
have been defined [9]:
• Intrinsic QoS - it is directly provided by the network itself and may
be described in terms of objective parameters, such as loss and delay.
26
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• Perceived QoS - it is the quality perceived by the users; it heavily
depends on the network performance but it is measured by the average
opinion of the users. Mean Opinion Score (MOS) methods are often
used to perform the measure of the quality. The MOS rating is the
arithmetic mean of all the individual user scores and can range from 1
(worst) to 5 (best) [10]. Even if there is a strict connection with the
objective metrics provided by the network, the user does not necessarily
perceived an increase (or decrease) in performance, in correspondence
of an intrinsic QoS variation.
• Assessed QoS - it is referred to the will of a user to keep on using
a specific service. It is related to Perceived QoS (P-QoS) and also de-
pends on the pricing mechanism, level of assistance of the provider and
other marketing and commercial aspects. For example, a performance
decrease may be surely tolerated by a user if a service is free, but the
same decrease will raise criticism if the user is paying for it.
At the moment, most of the QoS provision is offered in terms of intrin-
sic QoS (objective parameters) by using a Service Level Specification (SLS)
which is a set of parameters and their values which together define the ser-
vice offered to a traffic [11]. SLS is a separated technical part of a negotiated
agreement between a customer and the service provider on level of service
characteristics and the associated set of metrics, which is the commonly
adopted definition of a Service Level Agreement (SLA) [12, 13]. A possible
example of Service Level Specification is shown in Table 3.1.
Concerning device and network capabilities, the SLA may also indicate
the access technology that the customer can use, for example Ethernet, Wire-
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Service Level Specification Range
Connection type CBR / VBR / Best-effort
Scope End-to-end
Connection Identification Identifier or sequence of identifiers
Traffic description Packet rate / Bucket size / Max burst size
Performance guarantees Packet loss / Packet transfer delay / Jitter
Multi Level Precedence Not applied / Routine / Immediate / Flash
Table 3.1: Possible example of Service Level Specification.
less LANs, GSM, UMTS, Ad-hoc Network, GPRS and Satellite Access. Even
if the SLS does not change, SLA should also consider these aspects that have
a relevant impact on the customer choices.
3.2 QoS Classes, Applications and Metrics
Many applications nowadays need QoS. Some of them are telemedicine,
tele-control (remote control of robots in hazardous environments, remote
sensors and systems for tele-manipulation), tele-learning, telephony, video-
conferences, online gaming, multimedia streaming and applications for emer-
gencies and security. Each application, having very different characteristics,
needs a specific degree of service, defined at the application layer.
Several standardization bodies have tried to define service categories, also
called QoS Classes, to be intended at application layer. ITU-T suggests a
definition of QoS classes [14] for the IP world which is summarized in Table
3.2.
A further step is to associate objective QoS requirements to the QoS
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QoS Class Characteristics
0 Real-time, jitter sensitive, highly interactive
1 Real-time, jitter sensitive, interactive
2 Transaction data, highly interactive
3 Transaction data, interactive
4 Low loss only (short transactions, bulk data, video streaming)
5 Traditional applications of default IP networks
Table 3.2: ITU-T Y-1541 Qos Classes.
traffic classes generically defined above. Concerning the IP environment, the
QoS objective metrics mostly used [15] are as follows:
• IPLR - IP Packet Loss Ratio
• IPTD - IP Packet Transfer Delay
• IPDV - IP Packet Delay Variation (known as Jitter)
• IPER - IP Packet Error Ratio
Another metric often considered is the skew, which is the average value of
the difference of the delays measured by packets belonging to different media
such as voice and video within a video-conference service. In this case, if the
skew is large, there is no synchronization between voice and video with the
resulting effect of a bad dubbing.
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3.3 Approaches to QoS Management
QoS management techniques are needed in order to offer the necessary tools
to guarantee specific QoS requirements. A possible classification of QoS
management functions is described in the following [10].
Over Provisioning It consists of purchasing an oversupply of bandwidth
to solve the challenges. This approach ignores not only bandwidth
optimization but also possible future trends and requirements of new
services. It cannot be classified exactly as a solution.
Flow Identification The identification of packets so that they may receive
a different treatment within the network is fundamental to guarantee
QoS. Different technology show different method to classify packet:
Flow Label and Traffic Class in IPv6, ToS and tuple [IP Source Address,
IP Destination Address, Protocol, Transport Source Port, Transport
Destination Port] in IPv4, VPI/VCI in ATM, Label Value in MPLS.
Call Admission Control An accurate resource reservation to guarantee
that traffic flows receive the correct service is strictly needed. The
acceptance or rejection of a new connection is performed subject to
a check about the availability of network resources in consequence of
specific requirements. After that, if enough resources are available,
they are reserved.
Traffic Control (Shaping) Shaping policies limit flows to their committed
rates in order for the flows to be conform with their traffic descriptors.
If connections exceed their bandwidth consumption specifications, the
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network, which has dimensioned resources in strict dependence on the
declarations, cannot guarantee any specified QoS requirement. Two
common methods used in literature to shape traffic are Leaky Bucket
and Token Bucket [16].
Scheduling Packet scheduling specifies the service policy of a queue of a
node. In practice, scheduling decides the order that is used to pick the
packets out of the queue and to transmit them over the channel. The
main problem arises from the impossibility of assigning the committed
bandwidth to a specific flow at each time instant. A clear and complete
revision of the most interesting schedulers is reported in [17].
Queue Management Scheduling is often linked to queue management
schemes. They are used, for example, to establish the dropping strategy
when the buffer is full. Possible policies include: Tail Drop (discarding
the packet arrived last), Front Drop (eliminating the first packet in the
queue), Random Drop (selecting randomly the packet to discharge) or
dynamic schemes.
Flow Control It is the process of managing the rate of data transmission
between two nodes to prevent a fast sender from outrunning a slow
receiver. It provides a mechanism for the receiver to control the trans-
mission speed, so that the destination node is not overwhelmed with
incoming data. Generally, flow control is implemented end-to-end at
the transport layer. Even if it may help avoiding network saturation,
it cannot guarantee a specific QoS requirement, if used alone.
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3.4 QoS Management in OpenFlow
As previously mentioned, Software Defined Networking (SDN) is revolution-
izing the networking industry by enabling programmability, easier manage-
ment and faster innovation [18, 19].
The SDN architecture is composed both of SDN enabled devices and of
a central controller (SDN controller). An SDN device processes and delivers
packets according to the rules stored in its flow table (forwarding state),
whereas the SDN controller configures the forwarding state of each SDN
device by using a standard protocol called OpenFlow (OF) [19]. The SDN
controller is responsible also to build the virtual topology representing the
physical one. The virtual topology is used by application modules that run on
top of the SDN controller to implement different control logics and network
functions (e.g., routing, traffic engineering, firewall actions).
Currently the Quality of Service (QoS) management in OF is quite lim-
ited: in each OF switch one or more queues can be configured for each out-
going interface and used to map flow entries on them. Flow entries mapped
to a specific queue will be treated according to the queue’s configuration in
terms of service rate, but the queue’s configuration takes place outside the
OF protocol. For example, the queue’s service rate cannot be modified by
OF.
Supposing that a flow is traversing a chain of queues from the source to the
destination node, and the flow data rate increases, a possible consequence
is that queues increase their occupancy, and a bottleneck may be generated
with consequent network congestion. The impossibility to change the bot-
tleneck queue’s service rate through real-time OF directives can lead to a
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severe performance degradation for the flows traversing that queue because,
without a proper rate assignment, it is very difficult to guarantee Quality of
Service requirements to the flows [10].
A possible solution to mitigate the performance degradation involves the
re-routing of the flows experiencing a violation of deadline constraints (e.g.,
the flows that are totally received beyond the fixed time constraint) [20] on
less congested paths or queues. The underlying idea is that, since we cannot
change the service rate of the queues, we act on the ingress traffic, mov-
ing a subset of flows on different paths or queues in case of need. In order
to be 100% compatible with current OF hardware, we impose no changes to
OF specifications and directives. Instead we propose controller modifications
and, in particular, we use one popular SDN controller: Beacon [21]. Our up-
dated controller will receive statistics about queues, flows and ports from OF
switches and will compute an estimation of the flow rates and of the packet
loss of the queues. Based on customizable policies, BeaQoS will be able to
select a subset of flows experiencing congestion over the bottleneck queue
and to re-route them on another and less congested queue, so improving the
switch performances. The action of flow re-routing may be exploited not only
for deadline management but also for efficient queue load balancing. On the
other hand load balancing is often seen as an action to prevent congestion
and, consequentially, to limit and delay performance detriment.
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3.5 Related works
Despite traffic engineering (TE) approaches are often ruled by MPLS-TE
[22, 23], the ability of the SDN controller to receive (soft) real-time infor-
mation from SDN devices and to make decisions based on a global view of
the network, coupled with the ability of “custom”-grained flow aggregation
inside SDN devices, makes TE one of the most interesting use cases for SDN
networks.
Global load balancing algorithms are proposed in [24] that addresses
load-balancing as an integral component of large cloud services and explores
ways to make load-balancing scalable, dynamic, and flexible. Moreover [24]
states that load-balancing should be a network primitive, not an add-on, and
presents a prototype distributed load-balancer based on this principle.
[25], shows that the controller should exploit switch support for wild-
card rules for a more scalable solution that directs large aggregates of client
traffic to server replicas. [25] also presents algorithms that compute concise
wildcard rules that achieve a target distribution of the traffic and automati-
cally change load-balancing policies without disrupting existing connections.
Furthermore, the authors implement these algorithms on top of the NOX
OpenFlow controller, evaluate their effectiveness, and propose avenues for
further research.
The work presented in [26] shows a system that re-configures the net-
work’s data plane to match current traffic demands by centrally controlling
the traffic that each service sends on a backbone connecting data-centres.
[26] develops a novel technique that leverages a small amount of scratch
capacity on links to apply updates in a provably congestion free manner,
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without making any assumptions about the order and timing of updates at
individual switches. Further, to scale to large networks in the face of limited
forwarding table capacity, [26] greedily selects a small set of entries that can
satisfy current demands and updates this set without disrupting traffic.
Reference [27] analyses a partially deployed SDN network (a mix of SDN
and non-SDN devices) and shows how to exploit the centralized controller to
get significant improvements in network utilization as well as to reduce packet
losses and delays. [27] shows that these improvements are possible even in
cases where there is only a partial deployment of SDN capability in a network.
The authors formulate the SDN controller’s optimization problem for traffic
engineering with partial deployment and propose a fast Fully Polynomial
Time Approximation Schemes (FPTAS) to solve it.
This last problem is also tackled in [28] that introduces a traffic man-
agement method to divide, or to “slice”, network resources to match user
requirements. [28] presents an alternative to resort to low-level mechanisms
such as Virtual LANs, or to interpose complicated hypervisors into the con-
trol plane, by introducing an abstraction that supports programming isolated
slices of the network. The semantics of slices ensures that the processing of
packets on a slice is independent of all other slices. They define their slice
abstraction, develop algorithms to compile slices, and illustrate their use by
using examples. In addition, [28] describes a prototype implementation and
a tool to automatically verify formal isolation properties.
In order to support traffic engineering in the SDN environment, OpenFlow
Management and Configuration Protocol (OF-Config) has been proposed.
OF-Config [29] is a protocol developed by the Open Networking Foundation
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Queue Configuration
Performance Metric 1-queue 3-queue
BF - packet loss 25% 71.16%
DF1 - percentage of flows matching the deadline 11.43% 74.29%
DF2 - percentage of flows matching the deadline 17.39% 19.57%
Table 3.3: Performance metrics of the traffic for 1-queue and 3-queues con-
figurations.
used to manage physical and virtual switches in an OpenFlow environment.
This tool tries to give to network engineers the ability to set policies and to
manage traffic across devices.
3.6 Motivations
Some approaches consider a single queue for each outgoing interface. In order
to support QoS mechanisms and traffic differentiation, it is common to con-
figure multiple queues in advance [10]. In order to highlight the importance
of traffic differentiation we perform a first group of simulations reported in
Table 3.3.
Flow entries mapped to a specific queue will be treated according to that
queue’s configuration in terms of service rate. Most of the previously men-
tioned approaches assumes the ability of SDN/OpenFlow to set the service
rate of the queues in each SDN device. This chance would be very helpful
to improve the SDN switch performance, as would be clear from a second
group of simulations reported in Table 3.4.
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Queue Configuration
Performance Metric Fixed Rate Variable Rate
BF - packet loss 0% 0%
DF1 - percentage of flows matching the deadline 100% 100%
DF2 - percentage of flows matching the deadline 25% 100%
DF - percentage of flows matching the deadline 34.78% 100%
Table 3.4: Performance metrics of the traffic for fixed and variable service
rate.
Table 3.3 shows the results of simulations we ran aimed at showing how
it is hard, without traffic differentiation, to guarantee deadline requirements.
During 120s of simulation, a SDN Switch s1 receives a mix of traffic, gener-
ated with iperf, composed of “Background flows” (BF) and “Deadline flows”
(DF). DF are the flows for which there is an associated deadline: the flow
is useful if, and only if, is completely received at the destination within the
deadline. On the contrary BF have no associated deadline. BF are CBR
flows with a rate randomly chosen in the set {50, 60, 70, 80} kbit/s. DF are
divided into two classes: DF1 and DF2. DF1 has a 5 seconds deadline, while
DF2 a 9 seconds constraint. The overall traffic descriptors and requirements
are defined in Table 3.5.
We tested two configurations by using 125 generated flows. In the first
one s1 has 1 queue on the outgoing interface (q0) with a FIFO (First Input,
First Output) service rate sq0 = 3Mbit/s, whereas in the second one it has
3 queues, each of them dedicated to a specific traffic: q0 for BF, q1 for DF1
and q2 for DF2. The service rate of the queues (set in advance) are sq0 =
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Traffic Class
Name Traffic Descriptor Percentage of Deadline
Overall Traffic Requirements
BF 50− 80 kbit/s x 50 s 30% -
DF1 4.5Mbit/s x 1 s 55% deadline: 9 s
DF2 1.5Mbit/s x 1 s 15% deadline: 5 s
Table 3.5: Traffic classes and their deadline requirements
300 kbit/s, sq1 = 1.7Mbit/s, sq2 = 1Mbit/s. The QoS metrics considered
here are the packet loss rate in percentage for BF and the percentage of flows
matching the deadline for DFs as shown in Table 3.3.
As one can note the 3-queue configuration consistently improves the per-
centage of flows matching the deadline and penalizes the packet loss rate of
BF. Setting the service rates of simple queues differently, the performances
will change but it is clear that traffic differentiation through multi-queues
interfaces gives the fundamental gears to manage deadline flows and to tune
the level of performances of the network traffic.
Table 3.4 shows the results of the second set of simulations we ran aimed
at showing how the power to change the service rate of the queues can im-
prove the deadline management performances. As the previous simulation,
s1 is receiving a mix of traffic composed of BF, DF1 and DF2. Again two con-
figurations are tested with the same number of generated flows. In the first
configuration, s1 has 3 queues with a pre-fixed service rate: sq0 = 2Mbit/s,
sq1 = 4Mbit/s and sq2 = 4Mbit/s, whereas in the second one, q1 can grab
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the spare capacity from the other two when it needs more bandwidth: sq1 is
in the range [4− 10]Mbit/s.
The variable rate configuration consistently improves the total percentage
of flows that match the deadline, leading it up to 100%, without any impact
on BF packet loss. In Table 3.4 the label DF tags the Deadline flows without
distinction between DF1 and DF2.
Unfortunately, as highlighted at the beginning of this chapter, current OF
specification [1] is not able to configure queues’ service rate and delegates this
task to an external dedicated configuration protocol: “Queue configura-
tion takes place outside the OpenFlow protocol, either through a
command line tool or through an external dedicated configuration
protocol.” ([1], Section 7.3.5.8). As a consequence, this paper, even if ap-
plies multiple queues for traffic differentiation, supposes queue’s service rate
set and unchangeable in a SDN switch.
3.7 Possible solutions
3.7.1 General Idea
Although the design and implementation of a new OpenFlow directive able
to configure the queues’ service rate would be the best solution in terms of
performances, this choice would come up with a main drawback: it would
be totally incompatible with current OF switches that would not take any
benefit from the directive.
For this reason we propose an alternative solution totally compatible with
current OF switches. The underlying idea is shown in Figures 3.1 and 3.2.





































Figure 3.2: Action of re-routing of
some flows.
Let us suppose that, during the network operation, the OF switch in
Figure 3.1 receives 5 flows that manages through 3 outgoing queues q0, q1
and q2. Let us suppose that the orange flow (i.e. the largest arrow) increases
its data rate so that q0 receives more packets than those it can handle. q0
incoming rate is higher than the pre-configured service rate. In this situation,
increasing the incoming rate eventually leads to packet loss and to a severe
reduction of the quality experienced by the flows in q0. Being unable to
change the service rate of the queue, a possible solution involves the re-
routing of some flows arriving at q0 to another queue (e.g., q1 in Figure 3.2)
in order to reduce q0 incoming rate. Re-routing mechanisms attempt to use
the spare bandwidth unused by other queues for reducing the load of more
congested queues.
Since we want to keep simple both OF switches and OF specification,
we design and implement re-routing mechanisms inside the SDN controller.
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Even if the idea is simple, the design of re-routing mechanisms involves func-
tionalities of the SDN controller and, in particular, the following features/
requirements:
• no primitives shall be modified with respect to the current OpenFlow
standard.
• the compatibility with early versions of OpenFlow (which is obviously
a must);
• the creation of a module able to handle statistics;
• the implementation of the proposed approaches;
The idea of re-routing and the strategies proposed in this paper can be
exploited both for specific deadline management purposes, and in the con-
text of the optimal management of hardware resources provided to common
software routers. Software routers can run on off-the-shelf general-purpose
CPUs and commodity hardware, rather than on expensive dedicated hard-
ware. Commodity hardware not only maintains a high level of programma-
bility and flexibility but is more cost-efficient than specialized hardware solu-
tions and network components. For this reason, software routers are largely
widespread [30]. On the other hand, it has been proved that the CPU is the
main bottleneck in a software router. Recent advances propose to increase
the packet processing performance through parallel processing based on off-
the-shelf multi-core processors [31]. In more detail, current software routers
implement filters for multi-queue NICs (Network Interface Controllers) used
to address incoming packets to a certain queue based on specific packet at-
tributes. By these filters, NICs are able to efficiently distribute the incoming
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packet processing workload across multiple CPU cores. This also ensures that
each packet of a specific flow is served by the same CPU core so avoiding,
for example, packet reordering [32].
Instead of using dedicated hardware filters provided by NICs we propose a
flexible solution based on the OpenFlow architecture. Our approach consists
in using an OF software controller which can monitor incoming flows and
has the intelligence to decide the correct queueing strategy. We develop a
series of control algorithms able to re-arrange flows in order to make lighter
the computational burden of the CPU by equally distributing flows among
the available queues.
3.7.2 Implementation: BeaQoS
We chose Beacon [21] as SDN controller. Beacon is a multi-threaded Java-
based controller that relies on OSGi and Spring frameworks and it is highly
integrated into the Eclipse IDE. Anyway, independently of the specific choice
of the controller, our modifications can be implemented in any controller. The
structure of the controller consists of a group of functions (called bundles)
with dedicated functionalities. The main bundle we focused on is the Routing
one, which takes care of finding the correct path between the source and
destination to forward packets. Moreover, we created an ad-hoc bundle,
called Statistics, to the purpose of collecting and processing the statistics of
the reply messages provided by network switches. The principal proposed
modifications of Beacon are:
Statistics Polling Beacon controller has been modified in order to send
statistic requests to the switches. We added a function that triggers
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the dispatch of statistic and feature request messages with a polling
interval (PI) configurable through an external properties file. We also
designed and implemented a class dedicated to the creation of statistic
request messages, such as ofp flow stats request, ofp port stats request,
ofp queue stats request [1], in order to obtain useful information about
the status of flows, ports and queues respectively.
Statistics This module has two main functions: one is devoted to the cre-
ation of the data structures needed to generate a database of statistics
related to the network nodes, the other one is dedicated to implement
the collection of data extracted from the messages about statistics. The
reply messages obtained from the network switches are the introduced
ofp flow stats, ofp port stats, ofp queue stats. In addition to the basic
statistics that the OpenFlow protocol 1.0 makes available, we added
specific functions to the controller, which allow BeaQoS to exploit the
collected data in order to compute parameters useful to apply the cho-
sen strategy. The additional statistics computed by BeaQoS, compared
with the ones available in OpenFlow 1.0, are shown in Table 3.6.
The main extracted feature is the Estimated Rate (ER) for ports,
queues, and flows. We computed the Estimated Rate ERt at a given





in which t is the sampling instant, TBt are the transmitted bytes at
the current instant, TBt−1 are the transmitted bytes at the previous
sampling instant and PI represents the polling interval in seconds.
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Statistics available Statistics computed
in OpenFlow 1.0 by BeaQoS
Tx Bytes per Flow → Estimated Rate per Flow
Tx Bytes per Port → Estimated Rate per Port
Tx Bytes per Queue → Estimated Rate per Queue
Flow Match  → Flows per QueueFlow Actions
Queue ID
Table 3.6: BeaQoS Statistics compared with OpenFlow 1.0 statistics.
Obviously the quantity “transmitted bytes” and, consequently, the ex-
pression in (3.1), may be applied to ports, queues, and flows. Another
parameter we extracted is the number of flows currently belonging to
a specific queue (Flows per Queue).
Routing This module has been modified so as to implement the proposed al-
gorithms. When a switch receives a new flow, it contacts the controller
in order to know where to forward the traffic. When the controller has
to assign each flow to a specific queue, it checks a variable that iden-
tifies the algorithm to run. BeaQoS performs a routine to select the
correct queue based on the chosen strategy and then notifies the node
through the installation of a flow modification.
The proposed approaches are described in detail in the following sec-
tion.
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3.8 Re-Routing Strategies Analysis
In this section, we present two main scenarios in which we compare different
proposed re-routing algorithms to find the most efficient solution. The first
scenario deals with the problem of the priority flows that must be served
within a specific deadline, as introduced in Section 3.6. The second one faces
the issue of balancing the load among different queues in a single SDN node.
3.8.1 Deadline Management Scenario
In this scenario we consider both “Background flows” (BF) and “Deadline
flows” (DF). As previously described, DF are flows for which there is an
associated deadline: the flow is useful if, and only if, it completes within
the deadline [20]. DF are of interest in datacenter applications (e.g., web
search, social networking) where user requests need to be satisfied within a
specified latency target and when the time expires, responses, irrespective
of their completeness, are shipped out (Today’s online services have service
level agreements (SLAs) baked into their operation [33, 34, 35]). Moreover,
online services have a partition-aggregate workflow, being user requests par-
titioned among (multiple) layers of servers (workers) whose results are then
aggregated to form the response. The combination of latency targets and
partition-aggregate workflow has implications for the traffic inside the data-
center. Specifically, for any network flow initiated by these workers, there is
an associated deadline.
We propose and implement two schemes in order to provide a basic sup-
port for deadline management inside a SDN network with mixed traffic BF,
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DF1 (each flow with deadline1) and DF2 (each flow with deadline2). To
clarify the description of these approaches we assume that all interfaces of
each switch are configured with three queues: q0, q1, q2. q0 is dedicated to
BF, whereas the others are used for DF1 and DF2, respectively. The schemes
are the following:
Dedicated This scheme assigns each traffic class to a specific queue of the
considered switch port. Upon the arrival of a new flow inside the switch,
the routing engine of the Beacon controller decides which queue to
choose based on the traffic descriptor of the flow. BF are enqueued on
q0, DF1 are assigned to q1 and DF2 are assigned to q2.
Deadline This scheme is triggered when the controller receives a request
from a switch on how to manage an upcoming flow. The routing module
checks the Type of Service field1: BF are enqueued on q0, whereas for
DF1 or DF2, the controller chooses the less utilized queue qi∗ . The
utilization of the queues is computed based on the following function
U (qi):
i∗ = arg min
i=1,2
U (qi) ; U (qi) = sqi −
∑
k
targetk · nk,qi i = 1, 2 (3.2)
being: sqi the service rate of qi, known a-priori and configurable from
an external properties file; k the index that spans among the classes of
service (here DF1 and DF2); targetk the rate we need to guarantee to
the flow of class k2; nk,qi the number of flows belonging to the class k
1We choose the ToS field to differentiate DF1 and DF2 having in mind the DSCP (Diff
Serv Code Point) bits in the ToS field, but other solutions can be implemented.
2For example, a flow of class k with size of 100 kByte and a deadline of 10 s needs a
targetk ≥ 10 kByte/s.
CHAPTER 3. QOS IN TRADITIONAL AND SDN NETWORKS 47
Queue ID Service Rate Buffer Size
q0 0− 3Mbit/s 1000 packets
q1 2Mbit/s 1000 packets
q2 1Mbit/s 1000 packets
Table 3.7: Queue configurations.
and assigned to qi.
The aim is to maximize the number of DF whose deadline is matched, even
at the expense of background flows, if necessary.
We carried out the performance analysis on a PC running Mininet (ver-
sion 2.1.0) [36]. The scenario is composed of two hosts connected to a SDN
switch. The chosen implementation of the switch is Open vSwitch 2.0.2 [37],
managed by an instance of BeaQoS running on the same machine. Each port
of the switch is configured with 3 queues, q0, q1, q2. The rate assigned to each
buffer is shown in Table 3.7. The overall service rate is 3Mbit/s. The queue
dedicated to BF has a variable service rate ranging from 0 to 3Mbit/s: this
implies that q0 can be served only if the priority queues are not using the
entire link bandwidth. Queue service rates are configured through the Traffic
Control (tc) module in Linux Kernel.
The traffic used for these simulations, generated through the iperf tool,
consists, as said above, of 3 types of flows, BF, DF1 and DF2 composed of
the following percentages and features: 30% of the overall traffic is BF, which
is characterized by a random rate chosen in the set {50, 60, 70, 80} kbit/s and
a duration of 50 s; 55% is DF1, generating data at 4.5Mbit/s for 1 s and,
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Figure 3.3: Percentage of flows that satisfy the deadline, computed with
H = 100.
undergoing a deadline of 9 s; and 15% is DF2 with 1.5Mbit/s data rate
for 1 s and with a deadline of 5 s. The summary of traffic descriptors and
requirements are reported in Table 3.5, already used for the results in Section
3.6.
In this scenario we compare the performances of the two different pro-
posed solutions: Dedicated and Deadline.
We ran an emulation of 3 hours of duration composed of 3000 flows structured
into BF and DF flows as described above. We present the obtained values
averaged over an Horizon (H) of consecutive flows. Each averaged value
is called Emulation Sample ID. The metrics used to compare the proposed
approaches are the percentage of Matched Deadline Flows (e.g., the percent-
age of flows satisfying the deadline) and the Loss of Background Flows (i.e.
the percentage of lost packets of BF flows). For what concerns Figures 3.3
and 3.4, showing the Matched Deadline Flows, an Horizon H = 100 and
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Figure 3.4: Percentage of flows that satisfy the deadline, computed with
H = 250.
H = 250, respectively, is applied taking into account only DF flows. Figures
3.5 and 3.6, showing the Loss of Background Flows, apply again H = 100
and H = 250, respectively, but involving only BF flows.
Intuitively, large H values capture the steady state of the system and
small H values present more measurement noise. Instead of choosing a spe-
cific H or trying to capture a flat steady state behaviour, we decided to track
the performances over fixed time horizons in order to obtain a more realistic
approach, as discussed in [38] and [39]. The results of these tests show that
the Deadline scheme allows satisfying the time constraints of a much larger
number of DF than the Dedicated scheme. In practice, the Deadline scheme
is able to double, on average, the performance of the other approach, refer-
ring to Matched Deadline Flows (Figures 3.3, 3.4). The improvement of the
number of DF flows matching the deadline is obtained at the expense of BF
traffic, which suffers from a much higher packet loss than in the Dedicated
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Figure 3.5: Percentage of lost packets for Background Flows, computed with
H = 100.
scheme, as shown in Figures 3.5 and 3.6.
In short independently of the H value, the Deadline technique is better
than the Dedicated one with respect to the percentage of satisfied deadlines
for DF flows, at the cost of increasing the loss achieved on BF flows.
Even if the flow specifications are not adherent to a specific real envi-
ronment, the conducted experiments prove the effectiveness of the presented
algorithms. This is true also for what concern the loss of background flow,
which, as stated in this chapter, are considered expendable with respect to
deadline ones.
3.8.2 Queue Balancing Scenario
As far as load balancing strategies are concerned, we propose three schemes
aimed at equalizing the traffic burden in each queue. In order to better
illustrate the operating principles of our solutions, we assume a network
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Figure 3.6: Percentage of lost packets for Background Flows, computed with
H = 250.
scenario in which each interface of each switch has four available queues,
q0, q1, q2 and q3. The service rate of the outgoing interface is equally divided
among the different queues. The proposed schemes are the following:
Min Load This scheme consists in assigning the upcoming flow to the least
loaded queue. This task is performed by the routing module of the
BeaQoS controller. When a new flow reaches a SDN switch the con-
troller checks the estimated rate (computed as in Equation (3.1)) of
the queues belonging to the considered output port and selects the one
which has the minimum value.
If we think to the rate of the flows as numbers, it is possible to model the load
balancing problem among the available queues as a problem of partitioning
a given set of numbers into a collection of subsets so that the sums of the
numbers in each subset (i.e. the queues of the switches) are as close as
possible [40]. This problem is already known in literature as Multi-Way
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Number Partitioning and it is NP-complete. For the sake of simplicity we
choose to implement an algorithm, which we call Multiway, based on the
greedy heuristic described below.
Multiway In this scheme all the flows are queued into q0 at the beginning,
then the controller periodically runs a scheme that sorts the flows in de-
creasing order based on the computed Estimated Rates (ER) in Equa-
tion (3.1) and assigns each flow, analyzed by following the established
ER decreasing order, to the queue with the lower utilization so far, in
order to equalize the load among the queues.
N-Migrations When the number of flows is huge, the Multiway approach
tends to become computationally heavy since it has to analyze and
possibly move all the flows traversing the interface. For this reason
we introduced the N-Migration strategy, where the number of flow mi-
grations is limited to N . The algorithm runs on scheduled times and
iterates N times a routine which selects a flow from the most loaded
queue and re-routes it in the least loaded one. The flow selected by the
strategy is the one which assures the best load equalization among the
queues. This selection is performed evaluating all the possible outcomes
through a simple simulation of re-routing.
Although these strategies may seem similar, the performance results are dif-
ferent. Tests about Queue Balancing use a very similar Mininet topology as
described for the Deadline scenario. The overall rate availability is 4Mbit/s.
The main difference is in the configuration of the queues inside the OpenFlow
switch: each interface of the switch has four queues, q0, q1, q2, q3 and the rate
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of the outgoing interface is equally divided among the different queues such
as each one has 1Mbit/s available.
The traffic used in these simulations was generated by using the iperf tool and
consisted of flows with a rate randomly chosen in the set 50, 60, 70, 80, 90, 100
kbit/s. Flow duration is 50 s.
The network was tested with increasing workloads: 100, 125 and 150 flows
running with different seeds.
To better analyse the results, we introduce a performance index that
provides a measure of accuracy of our algorithm with respect to the optimal
solution, which ideally allows getting the exact amount of traffic in every
queue to get load balancing. We call this parameter index and we compute









, t = 0, 1, . . . (3.3)
where rtqi is the measured output rate of queue qi and r
t is the optimal queue
rate, both evaluated at time instant t. In other words, indext is a measure
of the distance between our solution and the ideal one.
The following plots show the Cumulative Frequency (CF) of indext. CF
is defined as the number of occurrences over the total samples in which the
indext is below a certain threshold (index-th). Figures 3.7, 3.8 and 3.9 show
CF versus index-th, for Min Load, Multiway and N-Migrations in case of
100, 125 and 150 flows, respectively. For what concerns the N-Migrations
approach, the N parameter is set to 1 for all simulations.
The results highlight that, in all examined cases, Min Load and Multiway
schemes show a very satisfying behaviour and have better performances with
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Figure 3.7: Queue balancing performances with 100 flows.
respect to the N-Migrations approach. For example, when we consider 100
flows inside the network, as shown in Figure 3.7, we can say that, in 90%
of cases, the distance between our solution and the ideal one doesn’t exceed
5000 for what concerns Min Load and Multiway strategies. On the contrary,
N-Migrations accuracy curve has a less steep trend than the alternative solu-
tions: the value of index for this approach is below 5000 in 50% of cases. In
particular it is important to note that Min Load and Multiway behaviours
are very close to the Ideal one (CF is 1 for any index-th value, including 0)
and overlap it for a relatively small index-th.
Also the simulations involving 125 and 150 flows confirm the same be-
haviour, as shown in Figures 3.8 and 3.9.
Concerning N-Migrations: the results show that the N-Migrations approach
cannot achieve the same performances of the Min Load and Multiway. This is
due to the choice of the N parameter, which is the key of the algorithm. This
parameter can be set in order to tune the performances of this approach: as
the N parameter grows, the behaviour of the algorithm approaches the Mul-
CHAPTER 3. QOS IN TRADITIONAL AND SDN NETWORKS 55
Figure 3.8: Queue balancing performances with 125 flows.
Figure 3.9: Queue balancing performances with 150 flows.
tiway scheme. The choice of the N parameter leads to a trade-off between
performance and computational complexity.
CHAPTER 3. QOS IN TRADITIONAL AND SDN NETWORKS 56
3.9 Considerations
3.9.1 Scaling Performances
Concerning statistics (see Table 3.6) acquisition: the types of messages sent
by the controller are flow, queue and port requests that are used to gather
information about port rates, queue rates and individual flow statistics. The
controller receives three statistic replies, one for ports, one for queues and
one dedicated to all flows traversing the OpenFlow switch in a given instant.
Since the maximum information sent through the Ethernet frame is 1500
byte, each flow statistics reply message can report only the information about
10 flows. For this reason the number of flow statistic packets in the case of f
flows is df/10e. Given N the number of switches composing the network and
considering another two packets for port and queue statistics, the number of









Considering a significant number of flows f and switches N , the number of
packets p received by the controller can be large. This is the price of a fine-
grained control of an SDN network at flow-level (IntServ). The number of p
can be reduced by using the flows statistics for a small number of “aggregate”
flows. This could reduce the fine-grained control but relieves the controller
from the management of a large number of packets.
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3.9.2 Switch Coordination
Even if we show the results by using a single OpenFlow switch in the network,
it is possible to extend the concept across multiple SDN devices. The routing
module implemented in the BeaQoS controller can manage more then one
single switch. For each switch the controller computes all the needed param-
eters in order to provide the best behaviour, given the chosen algorithm. In
order to extend this concept to the entire network, given a specific path to
the destination, it would be possible to compute the optimal queue qi∗ for
each switch belonging to the specific path.
Alternatively, since the controller BeaQoS has the view of the entire net-
work, another possible solution is to examine all existing paths between
source and destination for the considered flow. The controller could then
compute the best path for the specific flow and finally decide the optimal
queue qi∗ for all the switches belonging to the selected path.
3.9.3 Timing Performances and Overheads in Queue
Balancing Scenario
In queue balancing scenario timing performances are essential to guarantee an
“almost” instantaneous load balance among queues in each switch. The main
difficulty of this approach is due to the remote nature of the actions of the
SDN controller that acts as if the actions were internal switch functionalities.
The time elapsing from the load imbalance event at the switch and the new
queue balance (queue balance delay) can be expressed as the sum of several
components, as depicted in Figure 3.10.
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Figure 3.10: Timing Performances in Queue Balancing Scenario.
All our tests are performed with a relatively small number of flows. This
allows the controller to manage per flow performances. Considering the Mul-
tiway algorithm, the controller can reorder the total amount of flows travers-
ing an SDN switch in a time of the order of milliseconds. Moreover, consid-
ering that the controller is connected with the switches using an out of band
connection, the time needed to deliver the flow modifications is negligible.
In a large scale scenario with a huge number of flows, it is possible to
aggregate flows, reducing the number of sent flow stats and the computation
time of the Multiway algorithm.
3.10 Conclusion about Support of Quality of
Service in SDN
The impossibility to configure the service rate of the queues in a OpenFlow
switch through an OF directive is a limitation that could reduce the quality
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management capabilities in an SDN network but it is a fact for now. In this
chapter, exploiting the re-routing mechanism, we propose a method able to
provide a basic deadline management support and an efficient queue balanc-
ing without any modification of OpenFlow specifications and switches. We
present BeaQoS, an updated version of the Beacon controller able to receive
statistics from OpenFlow switches, compute more complex statistics and de-
cide the best queue re-routing strategy. We show the results obtained in
performance tests in which we compare alternative Deadline Management
approaches and Queue Balancing solutions. Our cases of study show that
the proposed solutions allow getting satisfying results when applied to the
current OpenFlow environment. Future developments will be devoted to the
scalability tests of our solutions and to the study of more complex queue man-
agement schemes that could lead to further improvements in performances.
We also plan to develop an extension of our internal re-routing approach for
the computation of alternative paths between the source and destination, in
order to reduce the network congestion.
Chapter 4
SDN in Satellite Environment
The upcoming 5th generation of mobile networks (5G) is specifically con-
ceived to provide extreme flexibility levels by-design to support services and
applications with highly heterogeneous requirements in terms of performance,
scalability, and deployment scenarios. To cope with these challenging objec-
tives, the current specification of the 5G can be considered as “a network
of networks”, since it will allow the adoption and combination (as needed
by the overlying applications) of different and alternative network stacks and
communication technologies. The “virtualization” paradigm is the key cross-
cutting enabler of the 5G design. It will pervade the 5G architecture at any
layer, in order to provide the related resources “as-a-Service”.
Clear and tangible examples of this process are Network Functions Virtu-
alization (NFV), Software Defined Networking (SDN), and Software Defined
Radio (SDR) technological frameworks, which, together, constitute the “vir-
tualization” engine of the 5G architecture [41]. Such technological frame-
works fully decouple hardware infrastructures from network protocols and
60
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functions and introduce advanced multi-tenancy capabilities such as the pos-
sibility of creating multiple isolated “virtual” domains over the same infras-
tructure, where multiple tenants can build and run their customized network
services. To fully exploit these new capabilities and expose them towards ver-
tical industries and Over-The-Top (OTT) players, the 3rd Generation Part-
nership Project (3GPP) and Next Generation Mobile Networks (NGMN) Al-
liance are radically redesigning NorthBound interfaces of telecommunication
platforms, by adopting “Network Slicing” [41] as a base service model. The
Business/Operational Support Systems (BSS/OSS) of upcoming 5G network
platforms are meant to expose “customized” and isolated virtual projections
of the mobile network (i.e. Network Slices) to vertical industries and OTT
players, so as to enable them to run their applications and services on top of
these network slices. To this end, a network slice is composed of a number of
logical sub-networks that can have different roles and configurations. Such
subnetworks can be instantiated as “private” network projections inside the
slice, or shared among multiple slices (e.g., to attach multiple slices to the
same radio access network).
The potential role of satellite networking in such ecosystem becomes man-
ifest if referred to this slicing model, within which satellite resources can be
embedded, either as Physical Network Functions (PNFs), when considered
in their current deployment, or, with much greater relevance, by including
their virtualized operational components as manageable entities in the 5G
architectural framework. Thanks to their intrinsic ubiquity and broadcast-
ing capabilities, satellite networks can play multiple roles in 5G. The satellite
can act as a main single backhaul segment for rural areas, aircrafts, vessels,
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trains, or as additional backhaul means to opportunistically provide addi-
tional connectivity/bandwidth resources, also improving service continuity,
or as a pure transport subnetwork.
The integration and use of satellite technology within the 5G ecosystem
obviously poses new architectural and service requirements/limitations. For
instance, on one side, it is reasonable to assume that satellite subnetworks
can be directly applied to those traffic flows (e.g., mission critical data) that
are associated with 3GPP 5G [42] Quality of Service (QoS) Indicators (5QI)
allowing delays in the order of 1-2 hundred milliseconds. On the other side,
satellite subnetworks can be adopted to facilitate and make more effective
the deployment and operations of other intermediate 5G subsystems such as
edge computing nodes needed to cope with tighter and more challenging 5QI
levels, as for Augmented Reality applications. In the edge computing sce-
nario, satellite interconnectivity may be exploited for the unicast/multicast/
broadcast geographical distribution of video, audio, and application software
binaries to a large number of terminals simultaneously.
In order to enable this deep integration between satellite and 5G, a
number of actions should be undertaken to bring state-of-the-art satellite
technologies closer to the virtualization paradigm used within the 5G ar-
chitecture. Many issues are related to physical layer aspects; quoting [43]:
“non-orthogonal multiple access (NOMA), massive multiple input and mul-
tiple output (MIMO), cooperative communications and network coding, full
duplex (FD), device-to-device (D2D) communications, millimeter wave com-
munications, automated network organization, cognitive radio (CR)”. Nev-
ertheless, from the networking viewpoint, virtualization and multi-tenancy
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are key aspects. Despite satellite technologies are well known to provide
advanced network virtualization means, since they allow the dynamic man-
agement of multi-point QoS-guaranteed links, these capabilities should be
exposed “as-a-Service” to multiple concurring tenants. In this respect, the
potential impact of architectural frameworks based on NFV, SDN and SDR
might be more than relevant.
4.1 State of the Art for SDN/NFV Enabled
Satellite Networks
The physical and hardware separation between control and data forwarding
nodes is one of the main principles behind the SDN paradigm. Its imple-
mentation is based on three different functional planes: Management Plane,
whose purpose is to compute resource allocation strategies to provide each
user with the required QoS, depending on the user’s policies and current
status of the network; Control Plane, aimed at computing and enforcing for-
warding rules to a number of data forwarding nodes in order to properly route
traffic flows; Data Plane, composed of the nodes of the underlying network
infrastructure, whose only purpose is to forward the incoming traffic flows,
by following the given rules.
The aim of NFV is to decouple network functions from dedicated physical
devices, making possible to run such functions on general-purpose servers
which could be deployed in network operators’ datacenters. In this way,
a more precise hardware resource allocation and sharing can be achieved,
implementing Virtual Network Functions (VNFs) on virtual machines and
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assembling and chaining VNFs to create services.
These new concepts can also be employed in satellite communication net-
works, allowing:
• intelligent delivery and deployment of new services in a flexible and
programmable way;
• decrease in energy consumption, by virtualizing the functions per-
formed by the ground segment of the satellite infrastructure and con-
solidating/activating/deactivating them on remote datacenters;
• Capital Expenditure (CAPEX) decrease by exploiting general-purpose
hardware components to deploy virtualized functions;
• Last but not least, the flexible embedding of satellite networking func-
tionalities in the creation and dynamic adaptation of network slices,
along with the required resource provisioning at the level of the Satel-
lite Network Operator (SNO).
SDN and virtualization for broadband satellite networks are investigated
in [44]. This has been one of the first studies to include a vision of how
SDN and NFV concepts could be employed in satellite networks. The au-
thors propose a network architecture based on GEO satellite communica-
tions. Reconfigurable broadband satellite networks are also the focus of the
research work in [45], where a strategy is developed to deal with the prob-
lem of resource management based on a functional architecture composed
of virtualized functions distributed throughout the network. [46] proposes a
joint placement of controllers and gateways in an SDN-Enabled 5G-Satellite
Integrated Network.
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An SDN/NFV-based framework for integrated satellite-terrestrial com-
munication networks called SERvICE is considered in [47], which exploits
the centralized control of SDN to suggest a strategy to distribute the three
planes of the SDN paradigm in the various network nodes of a multi-layer
satellite network. The Management plane acts as the orchestrator of the
overall network in the Satellite Network Management Center (SNMC). The
Control Plane is divided into two parts: the space part, dealt with by the
space controller in GEO satellites, and the terrestrial part, in charge of the
terrestrial controllers implemented inside datacenters and Satellite Gateways
(SGWs). The Data Plane is also divided into space and terrestrial parts and
is composed of MEO and LEO satellites, SGWs, and other intermediate
terrestrial nodes, such as SDN switches.
In recent years, the growing interest in the next generation of networks
has led to an interest in and the proliferation of different project opportunities
financed by the bodies of the European Commission and the European Space
Agency. These projects are very important for the innovative aspects and
the problems associated with the use of new generation networks. Below are
some of the main projects concerning 5G networks.
The European H2020 SANSA (Shared Access Terrestrial-Satellite Back-
haul Network Enabled by Smart Antennas) [48] project has the objective of
increasing the performance of mobile backhaul networks, in order to meet the
5G requirements. Specific goals are to increase the capacity of the backhaul
network trying to meet the predicted traffic demand of 5G, to improve the
network resilience against link failure and congestion, along with the spec-
trum efficiency in the Ka band, to reduce the energy consumption of the
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current mobile networks and to ease their deployment. To these purposes,
the project proposes the use of smart antennas to set up a novel end-to-
end system architecture composed by both terrestrial and satellite nodes.
Flexibility in the network is achieved through a Hybrid Network Manager
(HNM), which includes configuration, event and topology management func-
tionalities.
The European H2020 project VITAL (VIrtualized hybrid satellite - Ter-
restriAl systems for resilient and fLexible future networks) brings NFV into
the satellite domain and enables SDN-based resource management in hy-
brid terrestrial-SatCom networks. A framework named Satellite Cloud Ra-
dio Access Network (SatCloudRAN) [49] is defined. Its main principle is to
virtualize a DVB (Digital Video Broadcasting) - Satellite Second Generation
(DVB-S2)/ DVB - Return Channel Satellite Second Generation (DVB-RCS2)
ground infrastructure onto a centralized cloud-based processing platform.
Three different virtualization levels are identified: network layer functions,
MAC layers functions, and physical layer ones up to the radio frequency
front-end of SGW OutDoor Units (ODUs). In detail, in the first level network
functions such as Performance Enhancing Proxy (PEP), admission control
strategies and QoS policies’ management are performed in a centralized hub.
IP packets are sent to the SGW. In the second level, the uncoded DVB-S2
frame (called BBFRAME) is created remotely and then sent to the physical
gateway. In the last level, data packets forwarded to the ODUs are physical
layer frames (I/Q symbols). This framework could allow a full virtualization
of the satellite delivery chain and its provision ”as-a-Service” to multiple ten-
ants contributing to the Satellite Network-as-a-Service (SatNaaS) paradigm
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[50].
ARTES 1 CLOUDSAT aims to determine the applicability of SDN and
NFV technologies in order to define and validate integrated virtualized satel-
lite - terrestrial architectures [51]. The network architecture is composed of
the following subsystems:
• Infrastructure, including the virtualization-capable equipment on which
network services are deployed: switches and routers of the satellite ter-
minals, and gateways.
• Infrastructure management entities, based on distributed management
paradigms, such as Virtualized Infrastructure Management (VIM) en-
tities for the SDN/NFV enabled segments and the satellite segment,
and a Wide Area Management (WAN) entity.
• Orchestrators, in charge of the deployment of services and resource
allocation within each network segment.
• Federated Manager, representing the interface toward each orchestra-
tor, as well as the interface toward final users.
4.2 Open Challenges
Despite the research efforts performed to fill the gap between the current
satellite communication networks and their envisioned network virtualiza-
tion evolution, we have identified some open challenges, which require being
further investigated and solved before proposing a stable and standardized
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network architecture. All these issues have a strong impact on the future in-
tegration of satellite technologies into the 5G ecosystem; for instance, on how
a satellite network may be included in a slice subnetwork, and how it may
support dynamic lifecycle operations such as instantiation, de-instantiation,
and tuning, as discussed in the next section.
The first issue to be tackled is how to distribute the different layer func-
tionalities that compose the SDN architecture, i.e. in which nodes to locate
the three SDN planes. This problem involves different factors, such as the
high propagation delays of satellite links and the processing power capabili-
ties of the considered components. Satellite networks may use different types
of satellites acting at different altitudes (GEO, MEO, LEO) and character-
ized by different sizes, such as pico, nano, micro, etc. For these reasons,
their communication capabilities are differentiated, in terms of transmission
frequency bands, transmission rate, and number of on-board antennas that
can be installed. All these variables can lead to different choices about SDN
planes positioning, and, consequently, to different satellite network architec-
tures.
Another concern in the design of an SDN satellite network is the imple-
mentation of the communication protocol between Data and Control Planes.
In traditional SDN networks, this protocol is identified in the de-facto stan-
dard OpenFlow. It enables the collection and processing of the network
status information in order to allow Control and Management Planes enforc-
ing policies and forwarding rules about current traffic flows. In a satellite
network there is the need to collect network status information that may be
insignificant in terrestrial networks, such as network topology changes due
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to satellite movements, satellite current available energy and storage space.
To allow this, some extensions of the OpenFlow protocol may be required.
As already mentioned, the network topology may change during the net-
work lifetime, owing to LEO and MEO satellites motion. As a consequence,
there is the need of a handover procedure to keep the flow tables of the
Data Plane nodes updated, performing new rule computations when needed.
Another situation in which handover is required is when a satellite terminal,
served by a given satellite, loses its visibility and has to switch to another one
[52]. Even in this case, a change of the flow rules inside the involved switches
and, possibly, reconfiguration of satellite NFV services may be needed, in
order to avoid service interruption. Checking the impact of satellite mobility
on virtualization and on the creation of logical virtual networks as-a-Service
dedicated to given use cases (slices) is indeed a challenging task.
Another open challenge is related to the problem of the gateway diver-
sity. The ground infrastructure may be composed of a set of satellite gate-
ways linked together through the terrestrial network. Therefore, they offer
different points of access to the space segment, which are geographically dis-
tributed in a wide area. This network topology, if really exploited, implies the
application of strategies to choose the best satellite gateway for the forward
links [53, 54]. The spectrum frequency bands used by satellite transponders
are high, which increases the achievable transmission rates but also the at-
tenuation due to atmospheric phenomena, such as rain. This means that the
access to the space segment may be, in a given period of time, more conve-
nient from one point with respect to another, both from the performance and
from the energy viewpoint. Selecting the gateway may give practical advan-
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tages, if properly orchestrated. A real-time change of the satellite gateway
for the ongoing transmissions due to the extreme attenuation of the forward
link of the currently selected satellite gateway is a possibility; however, on
one side, it should be transparent for OTT players using slices, and, on the
other side, it should be dynamically managed by the network control plane
in an agile and flexible fashion. For example, slice internal elements (i.e.
slice subnetworks) might be reconfigured to route traffic towards the new
gateways.
Other open issues regard real-time monitoring and resource constraints,
which are not limited to the widely investigated GEO and LEO scenarios.
Since the past few years, new kinds of satellites, such as CubeSats, have
been attracting the attention of a large number of industries and univer-
sities, thanks to their lower costs and shorter deployment. The size and
weight of these satellites are much lower if compared to GEO and LEO, but
they suffer from very strict constraints about, for example, available energy,
storage capacity, and computational power. These variables, among others
regarding the status of the satellites in contact with the satellite gateways,
should be monitored and controlled in the resource allocation process. At the
same time, they make the provision of slices more time-dependent. To cope
with the dynamic satellite features, slice provision and adaptation should be
performed along with real-time monitoring of performance parameters and
resource availability.
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Figure 4.1: Architectural Framework
4.3 Proposed Solutions
With reference to the 3GPP, ETSI NFV Management and Orchestration
(MANO, http://www.etsi.org/technologies-clusters/technologies/
nfv/open-source-mano) and ETSI Multi-access Edge Computing (MEC,
https://bit.ly/2IvXVaY) architectural frameworks, we can refer to the
architectural elements depicted in Figure 4.1 to highlight the main points
connected with the deployment of satellite-related functionalities and their
embedding as full-fledged slice components. Current satellite networking
elements can be seen as PNFs, providing long-haul connectivity. To be
integrated and orchestrated as slice components by an NFV-Orchestrator
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(NFVO), upon requests coming from the OSS to satisfy the requirements
of vertical applications, the functionalities of SGWs and Satellite Terminals
(STs) need to be virtualized except for ODU, which remains a PNF, basi-
cally conforming to the SatCloudRAN paradigm. To better highlight such
functionalities and their mapping to VNFs, in Figure 4.1, we have included
the representation of a satellite network protocol stack that can implement
either standard protocols such as TCP/UDP and IP or dedicated protocols
indicated as “Other transport/network solution”, with the intention to in-
clude proprietary architectural elements aimed at performance optimization
such as PEP and header compression. With the desired flexibility, satellite
components (physically and/or virtually implemented in VIMs) can then be
employed by the WIM in the backhaul, whenever needed to support applica-
tions whose KPIs are compatible with their characteristics, or even to create
transport links or subnetworks toward the Enhanced Packet Core (EPC).
The role of SDN here becomes instrumental to allow fast reconfiguration and
interconnection of attachment points for the functional components. In the
MEC framework, in the presence of otherwise isolated terminals, the satel-
lite virtual network may be the only means to deploy application components
close to their users and to provide them with caching at the edge, in order
to satisfy stringent application requirements.
Let us make a practical example. A vertical service request may be
monitoring and controlling remote installations such as oil and gas pipelines
through SCADA (Supervisory Control and Data) or, alternatively, tracking
assets like containers. Remote installations, as well as containers when on
board vessels, may be networked only through satellites, but Vertical Ap-
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plications may ignore this technical need and deliver the service request to
the BSS. The OSS checks multiple NFV services exposed by the NFVO and
selects the satellite transport providing a given quality of service in terms
of delay, loss, and jitter (if requested). To provide the assured quality the
satellite network may need to operate specific actions, from the transport
layer (e.g., PEP, TCP optimization) and network layer (e.g., IP DiffServ/
IntServ, IP routing), within the Satellite Independent layers, down to link
and medium access control and physical layer (e.g., MAC using SIC - Suc-
cessive Interference Cancellation -, adaptive coding and modulation, etc.) in
the Satellite Dependent part. These operations may be performed in a VIM
by one or more datacenters, not necessarily located nearby the satellite Earth
station, connected to each other by the WIM.
Open challenges identified in the previous section may be mapped over
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Table 4.1: Matching between challenges and Architectural Elements
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Figure 4.2: Road-map for an SDN/NFV-enabled satellite network
The integration of terrestrial and satellite networks in 5G through the
virtualization of network functions, the provision of slices, and the use of
general-purpose instead of ad-hoc hardware, will not be immediate. More-
over, the investments required to design and deploy a GEO/LEO satellite
communication network are huge, so current satellite operators cannot re-
place costly hardware components before the end of the scheduled network
lifetime, especially concerning on-board technologies.
Before implementing a complete operative case as the one used in the
previous practical example, a gradual virtualization would be recommendable
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to facilitate a preliminary integration in the near future. We have identified
three possible incremental virtualization levels, as shown in the clouds (a),
(b), and (c) of Figure 4.2, respectively:
(a) Ground Infrastructure, physically composed of SGWs (i.e., the nodes
interfacing satellite portions and ground infrastructure, which include
ODUs), Network Control Center (NCC) and Network Management
Center (NMC). The first step could be to virtualize network control
and management functions previously performed inside the NCC and
NMC, which would be virtually implemented inside a datacenter rather
than on ad-hoc nodes. These functions include dynamic network re-
source allocation, real-time control and non-real-time management of
the overall network and could include the actions related to SDN Man-
agement and Control Planes, such as user policies management and
forwarding rules computation. The functions performed by SGWs can
be virtualized and remotely located in one or more datacenters, re-
ducing the specific-purpose hardware components of the SGWs, which
could be limited to the ODUs, excluded from the virtualization. As
described in [49], there may be three different variants for the virtu-
alization of a SGW, depending on the virtualization “depth”: only
network and upper layers functions, such as PEP and VPN (Virtual
Private Network); network and upper layers + Encapsulation MAC
functions; network and upper layers + Encapsulation MAC + Physi-
cal layer functions, such as adaptive Forward Error Correction (FEC)
coding and modulation, giving access to satellite links.
(b) Satellite Terminals. The second step could be to virtualize the func-
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tions performed by the STs. Considering their role, the virtualized
functions could be the same as for the SGWs except for the scheduling
task that the SGW has to perform across many STs that are sharing the
same resources. In this case the SGW has to coordinate different STs
with different demands, QoS profiles and channel conditions, whereas
the STs do not have to deal with this task. Moreover, additional func-
tionalities related to the MEC and content caching paradigms can be
implemented inside remote servers to help reduce the latency.
(c) Satellites. The final step could involve the addition of virtualized func-
tions on board satellites. Considering the different kinds of satellites
and the various possible satellite constellations, both SDN Control and
Data Planes functions could be implemented on-board satellites. Satel-
lite communication functions could be virtualized in order to better
exploit limited available resources. This point, however, requires a
careful analysis of the on-board available resources, both in terms of
performance and energy consumption and implementation costs.
4.4 The role of SDN in the 5G Satellite Com-
munications
In this section, we focus on SDN in order to better understand which are
the consequences of its employment in satellite networks. The main princi-
ple of SDN is to centralize the intelligence of the network decoupling control
and Data Planes. SDN can be employed for different purposes. The most
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common is routing, but also congestion control, flow control, and even secu-
rity, allowing novel control and management strategies based on fine-grained
traffic flow identification.
The most commonly used communication protocol between SDN switches
and controllers is OpenFlow [1]. It is used to manage the flow tables inside the
SDN switches to forward packets. These tables consist of lists of flow entries
which include matching rules and corresponding actions. Each matching
rule contains a set of matching fields, i.e. a set of parameters to identify a
traffic flow, such as source and destination Ethernet addresses, source and
destination IP addresses, source and destination TCP/UDP ports, among
others. An action is defined for each matching rule. If there is a match
between received packets and matching rules, the packets are forwarded by
using the corresponding actions. If there is no match, SDN switches ask for a
new forwarding rule which is computed and sent back by the SDN controllers.
Several studies have already investigated the employment of SDN in in-
tegrated satellite-terrestrial networks. The main difference among them is
how the different authors have decided to locate the different SDN Planes
and their functionalities within the satellite network components. [55] inves-
tigates the use of the SDN paradigm in High-Throughput Satellite (HTS)
networks, identifying the most interesting use cases and perspectives: the
used network infrastructure is composed of a Geostationary (GEO) satellite
including the SDN controller, Satellite Gateways acting as SDN switches, and
a terrestrial Network Management Centre (NMC) implementing the Man-
agement Plane. Almost the same network architecture is considered in [56],
where an SDN-based Information-Centric Networking (ICN) architecture for
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an integrated satellite-terrestrial network is proposed. [55] also suggests that
a network composed of a Low Earth Orbit (LEO) satellite constellation in
addition to a GEO satellite system could bring benefits. A novel software-
defined satellite network architecture, called OpenSAN, is proposed in [57]:
the satellite ground segment infrastructure acts as the Data Plane, a GEO
satellite includes the Control Plane, while the Management functionalities are
performed by a terrestrial Network Operation and Control Centre (NOCC).
An architecture which exploits LEO inter-satellite links (ISLs) for data for-
warding and GEO broadcasting capabilities for rapid network deployment
is described in [58]. Other studies have considered a hierarchical multi-layer
satellite network where the Data Plane is included both in LEO and Medium
Earth Orbit (MEO) satellites [47, 59, 60].
Only [58] considers the computation of the time required to establish a
new forwarding rule and to route and deliver the first packet of the new
data. The rest of the packets will follow the same forwarding rule. The
required time is in the order of few milliseconds in terrestrial networks and it
does not significantly affect the application data delivery time. In integrated
satellite-terrestrial networks, it could be not negligible, especially considering
satellite link delays together with the strict performance requirements of some
applications. In this case, the aim of our work is to estimate the mean value
of this time in a software-defined integrated satellite-terrestrial network, in
order to identify which are the maximum performance requirements a certain
application can get if its data are forwarded through satellites.
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4.5 SDN-based Satellite Terrestrial Network
In order to understand better the possible implication in the use of SDN
in a satellite-terrestrial network, we introduced an example network shown
in Figure 4.3, which is composed of three portions. The network is very
challenging, in particular for the delay, because it involves GEO satellites,













Figure 4.3: Considered terrestrial-satellite network with focus on one of the
three equal portions
Each portion is composed of a set of heterogeneous terrestrial networks
which could be based on different technologies, such as 5G cells, Local Area
Networks, LTE cells, linked together by a terrestrial infrastructure but also
by a LEO satellite constellation, which is common among the 3 portions.
In this way, traffic flows with given performance requirements, especially
the delay-tolerant ones, can be forwarded through the satellite constellation,
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partially offloading the terrestrial infrastructure. Alternatively, the satellite
route could be selected in case of fault of the terrestrial infrastructure.
In details, the overall terrestrial portion is composed of:
• Ground stations: terrestrial stations linked, on the one hand, with
terrestrial terminals through terrestrial communication means (wired
or wireless) and, on the other hand, equipped with a satellite antenna
to send/receive data to/from satellites.
• Terrestrial hosts: they are all kind of nodes which can generate data
traffic, such as user mobile and fixed terminals and servers.
• Network Management and Control Centres (NMCCs): three terrestrial
centres which manage network resources and user requirements.
The satellite portion includes three GEO satellites. Each GEO satellite covers
a third of the shared LEO constellation. LEO satellites are linked with
the ground stations and, through ISLs, among them. The considered LEO
satellite constellation is a multi-orbit polar constellation where orbital planes
are circular and equally spaced among them. Satellites are equally spaced
within each orbit. Its representation is reported in Figure 4.4.
There are two types of ISLs: intra-orbit ISLs (ia-ISLs), which are the
links between adjacent LEO satellites belonging to the same orbit; and inter-
orbit ISLs (ie-ISLs), which are the links between adjacent LEO satellites
belonging to different and adjacent orbits. In this way, each satellite has four
bidirectional ISLs. However, in this kind of constellation, satellites which are
travelling at high latitude are not able to keep ISLs active due to their speed
and consequent Doppler effect. Another issue which could affect ISL status
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Figure 4.4: Polar LEO satellite constellation
is the presence of the so-called “Seam”. Orbital planes are equally spaced
around a 180◦ angle, hence there are two adjacent orbits whose satellites
travel in opposite direction (as shown in Figure 22.1 of [61]): the first ones
from south to north and the other ones from north to south. Communications
through the ie-ISL of these satellites could not be possible for the same reason
of the high latitude ISLs. In our network all ISLs are always active except for
the ones operating at high latitudes. Besides, we assume a “W” ISL pattern
(Figure 22.3(a) of [61]). Figure 4.5 illustrates our considered ISL model: the
horizontal size is two times the number of orbits and the vertical size is half
the number of satellites per orbit.
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Figure 4.5: LEO satellite constellation ISL model
We structure the Data/Forwarding, Control, and Management Planes as
depicted in Figure 4.6.
LEO satellites constitute the Data Plane and act as SDN switches. Their
only purpose is to forward the data received from ground stations through
the constellation following the routing instructions stored in their memory
and previously received by the GEO satellites. GEO satellites act as SDN
controllers. Their aim is twofold: each of them periodically collects and sends
information about the statistics of the underlying LEO satellite constellation
to the related NMCC; every time a GEO receives a new flow entry request,
it computes the forwarding rules exploiting the data management strategies
received from the NMCC and then sends a flow entry reply to the proper
LEO satellite. NMCCs collect and keep updated the information about the
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Figure 4.6: SDN Planes and functionalities scheme
network statistics received from the GEO satellites and the traffic flow per-
formance requirements (policies) received from the terrestrial hosts. When
NMCCs receive a strategy request from the GEO satellites, they establish a
data management strategy exploiting these information and send it back to
the GEO satellites. We opt for a distributed Management Plane in order to
reduce the access time between NMCCs and GEO satellites, even though, in
this case, a protocol to keep the consistency of this information is required,
as also mentioned in [57]. In some cases, Control and Management Planes
can be implemented in the same node. We have decided to apply the Man-
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agement Plane on terrestrial nodes in order to reduce the time to install and
update traffic flow policies and to avoid storing a huge amount of information
and tackling a high computational effort on-board GEO satellites that have
storage, energy, and computational power constraints.
Taking into account all these steps, the time required to route a new traffic
flow could be quite large, especially considering the delay of GEO satellite
links. In the next section, we will estimate the mean value of this time, in
order to quantify its impact on the expected performances and identify the
maximum performance requirements that allow the use of the satellites.
4.6 Time estimation model
We consider a terrestrial host THS generating data packets destined to an-
other terrestrial host THD located in areas covered by two different ground
stations GSS and GSD, respectively. THS sends its packets to GSS which
uploads them to the LEO satellite LES (which is an SDN switch) in contact
in that moment. THS’s packets are a new traffic flow for LES that requires
a specific forwarding rule to the GEO satellite GES (an SDN controller)
which is covering the LEO constellation portion where LES is located. GES
contacts the related NMCC NMS asking for information about the current
status of the network and the performance policy related to the identified
traffic flow. A routing path from LES to the LEO satellite LED (also an
SDN switch) in contact with GSD is computed by GES. Proper forwarding
rules are sent to each involved LEO satellite/SDN switch. If LED is located
in an area covered by another GEO satellite/SDN controller GED, a portion
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of the routing path includes the LEO satellites inside GED’s coverage area.
In this case, the required information will be sent also to GED through its
related NMCC NMD. When LES receives its forwarding rule, the packets
are sent through the SDN-based LEO network until they reach LED. Finally,
LED downloads them to GSD and then to their final destination THD.
To ease the model always keeping the considered scenario as close as pos-
sible to a real one, we consider only propagation delays. We ignore transmis-
sion, queuing, and forwarding delays in this case, because they may be con-
sidered negligible compared to the satellite link propagation delays for traffic
flows characterized by short duration. We assume that there is no handoff
during the overall described process, i.e. the topology does not change. Con-
sequently, the mean time T required to compute and establish a new set of
forwarding rules and deliver the first packet of the related new traffic flow
data to the destination may be structured into 9 components:
1. propagation time between THS and GSS for data packets;
2. propagation time between GSS and LES for data packets;
3. propagation time between LES and GES for flow entry request;
4. propagation time between GES and NMS for policy and network statis-
tics request;
5. propagation time between NMS and GES for policy and network statis-
tics reply;
6. propagation time between GES and LES for flow entry reply;
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7. propagation times of all ISLs from LES to LED for data packets;
8. propagation time between LED and GSD for data packets;
9. propagation time between GSD and THD for data packets;
The values of all these components depend on the distances between the in-
volved node pairs. The distances among adjacent LEO satellites belonging
to the same orbit is almost constant, therefore the propagation delay of ia-
ISLs may be considered as a constant (part of component 7). The distances
among GEO satellites and related NMCCs is constant, and, opportunely set-
ting NMCCs positions, is the same for each of the three pairs (GEO, NMCC).
Therefore the propagation delay of the (GEO, NMCC) link is constant (com-
ponents 4 and 6). The distances related to the other elements range between
a minimum and a maximum value. In this way, we can estimate the possible
range of T from a lower to an upper bound considering, respectively, the
minimum and maximum values of these distances, and, consequently, the
minimum and maximum values of the related propagation delays. Hence, T
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Equations (4.4) and (4.7) are obtained from Equation (2.2) in [62], Equa-
tion (4.8) is defined in [63], Equation (4.9) is reported in [64], and Equations
(4.10), (4.12), (4.13), and (4.14) are obtained from simple trigonometric com-
putations.
tGSTH mean propagation delay of TH÷GS links
tLEGS mean propagation delay of GS÷LE links
tGELE mean propagation delay of LE÷GE links
tGENM propagation delay of NM÷GE links
NL overall number of LEO satellites
qh,k probability that LES and LED are the h
th and kth LEO
satellite respectively
H iah,k number of ia-ISL in the path between LEh and LEk
tLELEia propagation delay of ia-ISLs
H ieh,k number of ie-ISL in the path between LEh and LEk
tLELEie mean propagation delay of ie-ISLs
dLEGS distance between ground stations and LEO satellites
c speed of light in vacuum
hLE LEO satellite altitude
RE mean Earth radius
θLEGSmin minimum elevation angle between ground stations
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and LEO satellites
dGELE distance between LEO and GEO satellites
θGELEmin minimum elevation angle between LEO and GEO satellites
hGE GEO satellite altitude
dGENM distance between NMCCs and GEO satellites
θGENM elevation angle between NMCCs and GEO satellites
ϕGE GEO satellite longitude
ϕNM NMCC longitude
ξNM NMCC latitude
dLELEia distance between two LEO satellites linked through an ia-ISL
SL number of LEO satellites per orbital plane
dLELEie distance between two LEO satellites linked through an ie-ISL
PL number of LEO satellite orbital planes
Table 4.2: List of defined variables
4.7 Results and Final considerations
To perform computations we use the python library math. To model the
considered LEO satellite constellation we exploit the python library networkx
that allows the creation of a connected graph and the association of weights
to its edges. In our case, the weights represent the communication delays of
the ISLs.
To the purpose of computing the mean overall time to establish the rout-
ing path between THS and THD, we need to set the position of the control
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centre defined in terms of latitude and longitude coordinates, the altitude
of geostationary satellites and their positions in terms of longitude. The
longitude of the NMCCs and GEO satellites are always considered equal
(ϕGE = ϕNM), so that the elevation angle between them, reported in Equa-
tion 4.9, depends only on the latitude of the NMCCs. Other parameters to be
set for the experiments are θLEGSmin and θ
GE
LEmin, which, respectively, are the
minimum elevation angle between a ground station and a LEO satellite and
the minimum elevation angle between a LEO and GEO satellite, respectively.
These parameters are set to a value of 10◦ in order to avoid the presence of
obstacles inside the communication path between the involved entities.
To take into account the effects of different paths in the simulations,




h,k, defined in Table 4.2, are introduced.
Assuming each couple of LEO satellites (h, k) having the same probability
of being the end points of the routing path’s satellite portion, we assign the
value of 1
N2L
to the parameter qh,k. Concerning the number of hops in the
considered paths, we derive the values by using the build-in function of the
python library networkx which returns all the possible paths between two
nodes in a selected graph, thus allowing to compute both H iah,k and H
ie
h,k.
The set of parameters used in the simulations are reported in Table 4.3.
Figure 4.7 shows the minimum and maximum values of T with respect
to the LEO satellite altitude hLE which influences the number of satellites
and orbital planes considered in the model, as reported in [62]. Since the
aim is that LEO satellites completely cover the Earth surface independently
of their altitude, a specific number of orbital planes and satellites is needed:
Table 4.4 shows the number of orbital planes and LEO satellites necessary in















Table 4.3: Set of initial parameters used for the experiments
order to cover the entire Earth with respect to the altitude of LEO satellites.
From Table 4.4 we can notice that increasing the altitude, the number of
orbital planes and satellites per orbital plane decreases.










Figure 4.7: Minimum and maximum T
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650 - 700 11 6
750 - 850 10 5
900 - 1050 9 5
1100 - 1350 8 4
1400 - 1500 7 4
Table 4.4: Number of PL and SL needed for the complete coverage of the
Earth
In Figure 4.7, as expected, T globally exhibits an ascending trend, since
the end-to-end-delay grows with the satellite altitude. We can also notice
that, every time there is a decrease in the number of orbital planes, and,
consequently, a reduction of the number of satellites involved in the complete
Earth coverage, T slightly decreases. This reduction is due to the fact that
a lower number of satellites is needed in order to obtain a complete coverage
of the Earth and, as a consequence, the number of hops to be performed
by the flows in order to reach the destination decreases. In any case, this
small decrease is balanced when the distance between two satellites increases
due to the growing altitude. Consequently, the behaviour of T keeps an
ascending trend. It is worth noting that, considering a maximum altitude
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equal to 1500km, the maximum end to end delay is about 0.709s. This type
of computation is essential to decide if a future 5G service can be forwarded to
satellite portions or not. The time required to route and forward traffic over
the considered SDN-based satellite network is not excessive but, of course, is
in contrast with demanding delay sensitive applications.
Traditional and currently operating satellite communication networks of-
ten rely on ad-hoc hardware components and proprietary software solutions.
This hinders the integration of satellite and terrestrial networks and also
of different satellite networks. New solutions are arising to ease the inte-
gration and allow satellites to be part of an overall Internet composed of
heterogeneous networks, according to the network evolution envisioned in
the 5G environment. The employment of SDN in satellite networks is not
straightforward but could be a possible solution.
4.8 Conclusion about the role of SDN in the
Satellite environment
Satellite communication networks are going to have a crucial role in the 5G
ecosystem which can take advantage of their high coverage and broadcast
capability to increase the number of networked users, and to improve the
reliability and availability of the overall network in particular in cases of
emergency and critical missions, service continuity and multimedia distribu-
tion. However, their integration with 5G terrestrial networks is a non-trivial
task and entails evolutions of the current structures. From the networking
viewpoint, network virtualization is a concept that will bring benefits in terms
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of lower costs, higher flexibility, and tailored service provision. The adop-
tion of SDN and NFV technologies into the satellite domain is seen as a key
element to accomplish satellite and mobile terrestrial networks integration,
allowing the creation of a heterogeneous 5G network architecture and the
provision of dedicated slices. In this vision, satellite network architectures
should be augmented with autonomous and flexible management of service
lifecycle operations, including the real-time monitoring of performance and
other 5G KPIs.
In this chapter we surveyed the outputs of some the main research projects
and studies about the integration of satellite networks in the 5G environment,
with the purpose of highlighting the current status of the research in this field.
We have described the open issues to be investigated before defining and
standardizing an SDN/NFV-based solution for satellite networks. Consider-
ing the difficulties of virtualizing these networks, an architectural framework
and a possible road-map including a set of possible future steps to allow a
gradual virtualization starting from the satellite ground infrastructure up to
on-board functionalities have been proposed. Furthermore, we investigates
the employment of the SDN paradigm in an integrated terrestrial-satellite
network where three GEO satellites act as SDN controllers and the Data
Plane is embedded in a LEO satellite constellation. A model to estimate
the mean time required to complete the SDN control actions and to deliver
the first packet of a new traffic flow is also proposed. The obtained results
allow understanding which is the lower bound of the required mean deliv-
ery time. This value should be used by a user/application to fix the perfor-
mance requirements in case the satellite component is used or by the network
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management to decide if traffic may be forwarded through the satellite in a
software-defined integrated terrestrial-satellite network. In the proposed time
estimation model, we have only considered propagation delays and assumed
there is no handoff, i.e. the topology is unchanged during the traffic flow
data delivery. Even if the assumptions seem reasonable for short flows, the
impact of transmission, queuing and forwarding delays must be considered
for wider and possibly congested scenarios. The aspects neglected here will
be investigated in future research. Other open issues to be tackled are: al-
ternative integrated terrestrial-satellite network architectures, including, for
example, Medium Earth Orbit (MEO) satellites; the study of a different dis-
tribution of the SDN Planes inside the network nodes; the impact of the
overhead introduced by using the OpenFlow protocol for communication be-
tween SDN controller and switches; the synchronization problems due to the
rapid movement of satellites; and the issues related to the migration of LEO
satellites from one controller to another.
Chapter 5
The Problem of Security
Important applications such as e-business, e-banking, public health service,
and defense system control are dependent on computer networks. For this
motivation they are often object of attacks by malicious software (malware).
Malware is software designed to intrude a computer system without the con-
sent of the owner through the use of viruses, backdoors, spywares, trojans,
keyloggers, botnets, and worms [65]. In this context accurate malware de-
tection is a necessity [66]. Countermeasures may be dedicated to specific
devices, as happens in the context of mobile devices [67, 68, 69] and FM
radios [70], to specific applications such as Internet chats [71], to operat-
ing systems such as Android [72], and to given environments such as Delay
Tolerant Networks (DTNs) [73] and AODV-Based MANETs [74].
In general Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) may help tackle malicious
intrusions. An IDS is a hardware/software designed to automatically alert
when someone or something is trying or has tried to compromise information
systems through malicious actions. [75, 76] contain a detailed and interesting
96
CHAPTER 5. THE PROBLEM OF SECURITY 97
classification of Intrusion Detection Systems depending on: the location of
the IDS (host based, network based, and hybrid); the detection time (on and
off line); the environment (wireless, wired, and heterogeneous); as well as the
architecture (centralized/distributed); and the reaction (active/passive). As
far as this paper is concerned, the most important IDS classification proposed
in [75, 76] regards the processing method adopted to detect possible intru-
sions: Misuse Detection and Anomaly Detection. Misuse detection defines an
abnormal behavior and considers all the other behaviors as normal. Anomaly
Detection fixes the normal behavior and considers all the other behaviors
as abnormal. From the operative viewpoint the former contains: signature
based, rule based, state transition algorithms, and data mining. The latter
includes: statistical, distance, profile, and model-based schemes. Misuse De-
tection (MD) needs to open and inspect the content of the packets or files
traversing the IDS either to collect and compare signatures with the available
signatures in a malware database or to apply a given set of rules. MD is often
very efficient, its drawback stands in the weakness of signatures/rules, which
may be referred to dated attacks, and in the required computation time be-
cause each single packet needs to be inspected. Anomaly Detection, and, in
particular, concerning this paper, Statistical Analysis Based Intrusion Detec-
tion (SABID) would like to avoid these drawbacks also at the cost of a lower
detection accuracy. Packets could not be opened and inspected and each
traffic flow can be monitored over time by measuring the statistics of a set
of variables (called features) to distinguish between anomalies (possible mal-
ware) and normal behaviors (normal, not infected, traffic). Some more detail
about these aspects will be provided in the next Section. In the framework
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of SABID systems this paper proposes a novel network-based IDS, called SF-
IDS (Statistical Fingerprint-IDS). SF-IDS uses the typical flow definition at
IP (Internet Protocol) layer and is aimed at deciding whether an IP flow is
malware-affected or not. It is structured into a training phase developed by
using a ground truth of known flows and an operative classification and deci-
sion phase. Both training and classification/decision phases are based on the
definition and extraction of a group of statistical parameters related to each
IP flow, which represent the Statistical Fingerprint of the flow and on ma-
chine learning-based classifiers devoted to distinguish normal from malicious
traffic.
5.1 State of the art
5.1.1 Machine Learning-based Classifiers
Machine learning-based classifiers are aimed at identifying to which set of
categories a new sample belongs on the basis of a training set composed by
data whose category is known. In our case classifiers are used to discriminate
normal from malicious traffic as explained in Section 5.2. Machine learning-
based Classifiers may be structured into two families: supervised and un-
supervised. Supervised classifiers require a training phase during which a
number of samples whose classification is known are used to carve N deci-
sion regions in the features space, being N the number of the classes to be
identified. All the samples whose vectors lie in the same decision region be-
long to the same class. A sample whose classification is unknown is classified
by determining the decision region where the feature vector of the sample
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falls. The methodology to carve the decision region depends on the chosen
algorithm.
Naive Bayes [77, 78, 79], among many others, belongs to the group of
Bayesian Classifier [80] and requires the independence of the features. Sup-
port Vector Machine (SVM) [78] is a family of methods that, given a set
of training samples, each marked as belonging to one of two classes, build
a model which assigns new samples to one class or to the other. An SVM
model is a representation of the samples as points in space. The two classes
must be divided by a gap which should be as wide as possible. New samples
whose classification is unknown are assigned to a class depending on which
side of the frontier they fall in. The gap may be created in different ways so
giving origin to Linear, Quadratic, Cubic, and Radial Basis Functions SVM.
K-Nearest Neighbors (K-NN) [77] input consists of the K closest training
samples in the feature space. A sample is classified by a majority vote of its
neighbors, with the object being assigned to the most common class among
its K nearest neighbors. In other words, K-NN uses a reference cell such
as an hyper-sphere. The cell is expanded up to include K training samples.
In the hyper-sphere case they are the K samples with minimum Euclidean
distance. The sample under exam is assigned to the class whose training
samples among the K samples are more numerous than the samples of the
other classes. DTNB [81] is a simple Bayesian ranking method that combines
naive Bayes with induction of decision tables. Ridor [82] models large data
sets, which results in rule sets having minimal inter-rule interactions and
simple to be maintained. SMO implements the sequential minimal optimiza-
tion algorithm [83] to train a support vector classifier: training a support
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vector machine requires the solution of a very large Quadratic Programming
(QP) optimization problem. SMO divides the QP problem into a series of
smallest possible QP problems that are solved analytically. J48 is a decision
tree algorithm that generates a pruned or unpruned decision tree by using
C4.5 algorithm [84]: decision tree algorithms begin with a set of cases, or
examples, and create a tree data structure that can be used to classify new
cases. Each case is described by a set of attributes (or features) which can
have numeric or symbolic values. There is a label representing the name of
a class associated with each training case. Each internal node of a decision
tree contains a test, the result of which is used to decide what branch to
follow from that node. The leaf nodes contain class labels instead of tests.
In classification mode, when a test case (which has no label) reaches a leaf
node, C4.5 classifies it using the label stored there. JRIP implements the
propositional rule learner Repeated Incremental Pruning to Produce Error
Reduction (RIPPER), proposed in [85]. Mentioned C4.5 and RIPPER oper-
ate in two stages. First they induce an initial rule set and then they refine
it using a rather complex optimization stage that discards (C4.5) or adjusts
(RIPPER) individual rules to make them work better together. PART [86]
exploits the fact that rule sets can be learned one rule at a time, without
any global optimization, and infers rules by repeatedly generating partial
decision trees. Random Tree, authored by Eibe Frank and Richard Kirkby,
builds a tree that considers K randomly chosen attributes at each node. It
does not perform any pruning and it has an option to allow an estimation of
class probabilities (or target mean in the regression case) based on a hold-
out set (backfitting). Again authored by Eibe Frank, RBF Network [87] is
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a fully supervised machine learning scheme that uses Gaussian Radial Ba-
sis Function (RBF) Networks. Random forests [88] is an ensemble learning
method for classification, regression, and other tasks. It operates through
a multitude of decision trees at the training time. Each user is assumed to
know about the construction of single classification trees. To classify a new
object from an input vector, the input vector is put down each of the trees
in the forest. Each tree gives a classification and the tree “votes” for a class.
The forest chooses the classification having the most votes over all the trees
in the forest. “Random Forests” is a trademark of Leo Breiman and Adele
Cutler.
Unsupervised classifiers are aimed at framing the flows under exam within
clusters without any “a priori” information about the samples. For the pur-
pose of this research we focused only on supervised classifier but future in-
vestigation can be made using unsupervised ones.
5.1.2 Misuse and Statistical Analysis Based Intrusion
Detection Systems
A rough comparison about processing method, accuracy, complexity, speed,
and limitations between MD and SABID (considered representative of the
entire class of Anomaly Detection for the aim of this work) methods is re-
ported in Table 5.1. In practice the comparison is between intrusion detection
systems that require the inspection of packets/files/codes and systems based
on the analysis of statistical profiles.
Concerning the large and heterogeneous family of Misuse Based Intru-
sion Detection Systems, recent research includes the following papers, among
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Misuse Based Statistical Analysis
Intrusion Detection Based Intrusion
Detection
Processing method It examines the It examines





Limitations It cannot detect A training data
new virus or set is involved
encrypted flow
Table 5.1: Misuse Based Intrusion Detection versus Statistical Analysis
Based Intrusion Detection systems.
many others. [89] is a paper whose experimental results show the detection
ability of the system to learn effective rules from repeated presentations of
a tagged training set. Best system accuracy is close to 90%.[90] develops an
automatic categorization system to automatically group phishing websites or
malware samples by using a cluster ensemble. Malware categorization results
range between 86% and 91%. [91] proposes a host-rule-behavior-based detec-
tion method, composed of a clustering engine that groups the objects (e.g.,
processes and files) of a suspicious program together into a cluster. Obtained
results vary depending on the fixed threshold of false positives (see Table 5.4
for a definition): if you want no false positives, then the system can assume
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71% true positives but if you relax the threshold you can get true positives
rates above 90%: 93.2% with 9.8% false positives and up to about 97% with
22.5% false positives. The authors show that their results are more satis-
fying than the ones got by commercial antivirus software. Concerning the
search and analysis of opcodes (from operation code, a portion of a machine
language instruction that specifies the operation to be performed), we can
mention [92] and [93]. [92] is aimed at individuating a subset of opcodes suit-
able for malware detection through SVM (Support Vector Machine). Using
opcode sequences typically needs to label a large amount of both malicious
and benign code. [93] proposes a method that uses single-class learning to
detect unknown malware families. Specific results vary if labeling is per-
formed through malicious or benign software but in general: labeling 60%
of the legitimate software assures about 85% accuracy. Among signature-
based approaches: [94] classifies packed and polymorphic malware through
a fast application-level emulator; the effectiveness is validated by showing
that malware is detected as a variant of existing malware in 88% of cases.
Classification is also quite quick: 1.3 [s] for a sample set. [95] compares
the performance of the intrusion detection systems Suricata and Snort. The
percentage of alerts detected is close to 100% for Snort while the one for Suri-
cata heavily varies on the operating network speed: 98% at 1Gbps, 91.8% at
1.5Gbps and 66.8% at 2.0Gbps. [96] selects the possible signatures and uses
only a subset of the necessary ones.
Concerning the systems that use Anomaly Detection (or also hybrid Sta-
tistical Analysis/Misuse Detection): [97] proposes a hybrid IDS combining
packet header anomaly detection (PHAD) and network traffic anomaly de-
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tection (NETAD). The combined action seems to work even if it is difficult
to detect precise percentages from the reported results. [98] introduces a
hybrid intrusion detection system that combines k-Means and two classifiers:
K-nearest neighbor and Naive Bayes for anomaly detection. The goal in [98]
is to decrease the false alarm rate when intrusions are detected and classified
in 4 categories: Denial of Service (DOS), U2R (User to Root), R2L (Remote
to Local), and Probe. The accuracy varies depending on the attack: from
92% of U2R to more then 98% for Probe. [99] describes a two stage archi-
tecture to tackle intrusions. In the first stage a probabilistic classifier is used
to detect potential anomalies in the traffic. In the second stage a HMM (Hy-
brid Markov Model) traffic model is used to narrow down the number of IP
addresses carrying the attack. The performance depends on the number of
states used for the HMN and on other used features: the best configuration
provides an accuracy close to 97% and a false alarm rate below 3%. [100]
introduces a hybrid detection framework combining misuse detection, which
uses a Random Forest classification algorithm, and anomaly detection, which
exploits the weighted k-Means scheme. The detection rate of the combined
approach is about 98% with a false positive rate of about 1%.
As far as Statistical Analysis Based Detection, two papers are particularly
meaningful for the topic of this research, even if they are not strictly related
to malware detection: [101] and [102]. Both contributions are aimed at de-
tecting application-layer tunnels throughout Statistical Fingerprints. [101]
presents a statistical classification mechanism called Tunnel Hunter devoted
to recognize a generic application protocol tunneled on top of HTTP or of
SSH. The accuracy is 100% for HTTP tunnels and above 99% for SSH ones.
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[102] aims at detecting DNS tunnels. The accuracy for a mix of applications is
close to 99%. Another important paper concerning the approach followed in
this work is [103], where streaming content changes are detected only through
traffic patterns built from the traffic volume achieved by routers. Other arti-
cles must be mentioned as relevant for this work. [104] introduces a scheme
for intrusion detection operating in WEKA, used also in our research. [105]
proposes to structure Machine-Learning-based intrusion detection systems
into Artificial Intelligence based and Computational Intelligence based ones.
The former refer to the methods from domains such as statistical modeling
(as we done), whereas the latter include methodologies such as genetic algo-
rithms, artificial neural network, fuzzy logic, and artificial immune systems.
[106] extracts a long list of features from the used dataset [107] and com-
pares, as done in this thesis (Table 5.5), different classifiers such as, among
the others, DTNB, JRIP, PART, RIDOR, all providing about 95% accuracy,
and SMO, assuring an accuracy above 97%. [108] compares J48, Random
Forest and Random Tree in the same operating environment by using the
same dataset and list of features presented in [106] and proposes to use a
combination of classifiers to enhance the performance, which is above the
99% in the best cases. The obtained results of these classifiers are very sim-
ilar to the ones shown in Table 5.5. [109] proposes a selection of features by
using swarm intelligence algorithms, such as Artificial Bee Colony (ABC) or
Particle Swarm Optimization (PSO), and evaluates the performance through
the same dataset used in [107].
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5.2 Statistical Fingerprint - Based Intrusion
Detection System - SF-IDS
5.2.1 Key Ideas
Our idea shares with [101], [102], [110] and the other papers mentioned in the
previous section concerning SABID, the idea of detecting something by using
statistical analysis. For instance “looking at simple statistical properties
of protocol messages, such as statistics of packet interarrival times and of
packets sizes” [102] may be useful to perform monitoring actions. “The key
idea is that the information carried by packets at the network layer, such as
packet-size and inter-arrival time between consecutive packets, are enough
to infer the nature of the application protocol that generated those packets”
[101]. This sentence, referred in [101] to tunnels, may be literally applied to
malware and for this reason useful for our purposes. We think that, observing
the statistical features of a specific IP traffic flow, we can get information
about the malicious (or not) nature of this flow. We identify an IP traffic flow
with the 5-tuple composed of the following fields of the IP and TCP/UDP
headers:
• IP Source Address (IP SA)
• IP Destination Address (IP DA)
• TCP/UDP Source Port
• TCP/UDP Destination Port
• Protocol
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These fields are considered as two-way (the inversion of Source and Desti-
nation Ports and Addresses is considered as one single flow) in the tests in
Section 5.4. This choice reduces the number of flows per each trace recorded
from the network, and allows creating longer flows that are more robust to
the noise than default short flows created automatically by hosts connected
to the Internet. The field Protocol defines the protocol used in the data por-
tion of the IP datagram. In practice it specifies the content of the IP packet
information field. The Internet Assigned Numbers Authority maintains a
list of IP protocol numbers which was originally defined in [111] and are now
defined through an online database specified in [112].
5.2.2 SF-IDS Architecture
The overall architecture of the proposed IDS is depicted in Figure 5.1, which
refers to a general-purpose architecture to analyze traffic flows whose op-
erative steps are detailed in the following. Such architecture has not been
implemented and used to perform experiments for which we have applied
a subset of the components appearing in Figure 5.1 and, in particular, the
“Packet analyzer” (object of Subsection of 5.2.3), “Malware DB” (used for
the training phase) and “Syslogger” (output of the packet analyzer). The
practical implementation of the overall architecture in Figure 5.1 is one of
the next steps of this research activity.
Packets from/to the Internet traverse the external interface (typically an
ADSL/ATM interface) of the system and are processed by a router in order
to be properly forwarded. At this level, if needed, some virtual interfaces may
be attached to allow sending/receiving packets through tunneling protocols














Figure 5.1: SF-IDS overall architecture.
and/or traffic encryption. This allows establishing virtual point-to-point (se-
cure) connections with the aim of creating Virtual Private Networks (VPNs).
Thus, different user sites may appear to be part of a unique wide network.
User applications, running in different locations, are enabled to communi-
cate with each other and, possibly, share common resources in the same
way applications are hosted on co-located computers. However, it is worth
noting that the adoption of VPNs only partially reduces the hazard to be
victim of malware. Whether a PC in the user LAN is infected by a malware,
the PC may easily infect other systems present in the LANs and belonging
to same VPN infrastructure. In other words, IDS mechanisms need to be
adopted even in presence of secure and encrypted links (tunnels) connecting
different sites of the same enterprise. Furthermore, some malicious tunnels
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may represent the media through which infected packets may be conveyed,
as mentioned in the previous section through the proper references. The IP
packets traversing the router are inspected by a “Packet Analyzer (PA)” in
order to detect possible harmful flows. The PA exploits the features of a set
of malwares stored in the so-called “Malware Data Base (MDB)”. Whenever
a malicious flow is detected, its features are logged in the “Syslogger“ sub-
system and, correspondingly, a new rule is compiled by the “Filter Builder
(FB)” and then added to the filter list (“Firewall Filter List - FFL”) of the
firewall. The new rule aims at blocking the just detected malicious flow,
thus preventing the related malware to access the LAN through the Internal
Interface (commonly, an Ethernet interface). It should be highlighted that,
if the system has more than one internal interface, each interface has its own
FFL.
5.2.3 SF-IDS Packet Analyzer
The Packet Analyzer represents the most original part of our work and the
object of the performance evaluation. Figure 5.2 sketches its main compo-
nents.
Incoming packets feed the “Feature Extractor” (FE) which performs two
principal operations. The first one consists in the identification of a traffic
flow on the basis of the flow definition provided before. The second operation
is the extraction of a number of features, discussed in the next Subsection,
from each flow. Under this perspective, each flow is uniquely described by the
vector Vf of its features. Vf is the Statistical Fingerprint of the flow. The
vector Vf is then passed to a group of classifiers, each of them previously












Figure 5.2: Block diagram of the Packet Analyzer.
trained by using known traffic traces to detect the malware presence on the
basis of a set of features. Each classifier makes its own decision: the flow is a
malware or it is not. Eventually, a Decision Maker merges the decisions made
by each classifier in order to produce the final decision regarding the flow
under analysis. Strategies adopted to make the final decision are discussed
in Subsection 5.4.4.
5.2.4 Statistical Fingerprint: the feature vector
The 14 components (indicated as features) of the vector Vf used to classify
each flow are listed in Table 5.2. As said before, the key idea is that the
following features associated to each flow are enough to infer the possible
malicious nature of the flow. The use of these features is coherent with the
literature in the field, see for example [113, 114]. [107] uses a larger and
different list, not strictly related to the features of flows. Any change to the
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features used in the table does not require any substantial change to SF-IDS.
5.2.5 SF-IDS Classifiers
The algorithms used to distinguish normal from malicious traffic on the basis
of the set of features extracted from each flow are machine learning-based
classifiers. The following supervised classifiers, coherently with the state of
the art presented in Section 5.1, have been tested to select the most perfor-
mant ones.
• Naive Bayes (NB);
• Linear SVM - the frontier between regions is a linear function;
• Quadratic SVM - the frontier between regions is a quadratic function;
• Cubic SVM - the frontier between regions is a cubic function;
• Radial Basis Functions (RBF) SVM;












Num Pack Number of packets
Tot Byte Flux Number of bytes
Flow Duration Duration of the flow in seconds
Byte Rate Byte rate
Packet Rate Packet rate
Delta Mean Average inter-arrival time of packets
Delta Std Standard deviation of inter-arrival time
LE “Entropy” of the packet lengths2
DPL Total number of subsets of packets having the
same length divided by the total number of
packets of the flow
First Len Length of the first packet
Max Len Length of the longest packet
Min Len Length of the shortest packet
Mean Len Average packet length
Std Len Standard deviation of the packet length
Table 5.2: Used features for each flow as Statistical Fingerprint.
2LE is calculated starting from the normalized occurrences of the packet lengths. Specif-
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5.3 Used traffic and performance parameters
5.3.1 Used Malware and Normal Traffic
The tests reported in the performance evaluation have been carried out by
downloading traffic samples from [115]. Table 5.3 contains the list of used
malwares together with the overall number of analyzed flows and packets.
Each flow appearing in Table 5.3 under the label malware is not exclusively
composed of malware affected packets but it contains also not affected traffic.
Obviously the two components can be distinguished to allow a correct perfor-
mance evaluation. Table 5.3 includes also the same quantities for the traffic
that is not affected by malware and is called “normal traffic”. In this case
these traces are totally malware free. Each malware has different features.
Cutwail is a botnet aimed at spamming.
Purple Haze is a botnet that records user activities. In practice, it is a
keylogger acting at kernel level.
Ramnit is a worm that has been used to get Facebook passwords.
Tbot is a botnet used for DDoS attacks, bank frauds, and cheats by using
e-money (bitcoins).
Zeus is a botnet that widespreads a Trojan to infect computers through
phishing or false download actions unconsciously performed by users.
Its main function is online banking FTP account violation.







N ), where N is the total number of packets belonging to the flow.
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ZeroAccess is a Trojan that affects Microsoft Windows operating systems.
It is used to download other malware on the infected machine and
is mostly involved in bitcoin mining and click fraud. It may remain
hidden on a system by using several techniques.
AlienspyRAT is a Trojan that gives attackers the ability to gain complete
remote control of a compromised system. It can be used to collect
a range of system-specific data, including operating system version,
memory and RAM data, Java version number, and other details, such
as passwords, and private information.
Kuluoz is a Trojan that tries to steal passwords and sensitive information.
It can also download other malware onto the infected PC.
Sality is a polymorphic file infector. It infects executable files on local,
removable, and remote shared drives. It can communicate over a peer-
to-peer (P2P) network and has the purpose of relaying spam, compro-
mising web servers, and extruding data.
Normal traffic used in the tests has been captured by using the tcpdump
utility.
5.3.2 Performance Evaluation Parameters
The performance of each classifier itemized in Subsection 5.2.5 has been
evaluated by comparing the results of the classification with the actual class
of the flow. Under this perspective, 4 cases, listed in Table 5.4, can occur.
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Malware Flows Packets
Cutwail 2347 35674








Normal Traffic Flows Packets
Normal Traffic 1 4969 833368
Normal Traffic 2 12552 3533925
Normal Traffic 3 23351 4428188
Table 5.3: Used malware and normal traffic.





·100, TP = NTP
NM
·100, FN = NFN
NM
·100, being NN the overall num-
ber of analyzed normal flows, NM the overall number of analyzed malware
affected flows, and NTN , NFP , NTP , and NFN the overall number of True
Negatives, False Positives, True Positives, and False Negatives, respectively.
True Positives and True Negatives are the Correct Detection Cases. False
Positives (False Alarms) and False Negatives (Missed Detections) are the
cases where the system fails, although the impact of FPs and FNs on the
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Evaluation Parameter Meaning
True Negative (TN) A flow is normal traffic, i.e., it is
not malware affected and it is correctly
classified as normal traffic.
False Positive (FP) A flow is normal traffic, i.e., it is
not malware affected but it is wrongly
classified as malware. This case is also
called False Alarm.
True Positive (TP) A flow is malware affected and it is
correctly classified as malware.
False Negative (FN) A flow is malware affected but it is
wrongly classified as normal traffic.
This case is also called Missed Detection.
Table 5.4: Evaluation Parameters.
overall performance is very different. Consequently the percentage of correct






where NTOT = NN +NM is the overall number of flows.
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5.4 Performance evaluation
5.4.1 Tools
The tests have been carried out by using a free machine learning software
called WEKA (Waikato Environment for Knowledge Analysis) [116, 117,
118], introduced in 1997 at the University of Waikato, New Zealand, using
the 3.6.10 version of the software. WEKA is written in Java, supports stan-
dard algorithms for data preprocessing, clustering, classification, regression,
visualization, and feature selection. All data have to be available in this for-
mat to be analyzed. Detailed WEKA characteristics are reported in [118].
All SF-IDS Classifiers listed in Subsection 5.2.5 are supported by this tool.
5.4.2 Evaluation of Single Classifiers
The analysis has been carried out taking into account the entire set of flows
in Table 5.3. Each single trace, both malware and normal, has been divided
into two parts (50% of the trace each). The first part of each trace has been
used to compose the file for the training phase, the second part to build the
file employed for the tests. The goal is to distinguish malware affected flows
and normal traffic.
Table 5.5 shows, for each classifier in Subsection 5.2.5, the obtained Accuracy
and the percentage of True Positives, False Negatives, True Negatives, and
False Positives. The last column of Table 5.5 contains also the 95% Con-
fidence Interval (CI) of the Accuracy values, computed through the known




, where NTOT is the overall number of flows
used for testing, taking the values from Table 5.3, as indicated above. The
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confidence interval may be simply computed in the same way also for TP ,
FN , TN , and FP . A good number of classifiers is close to 99% concerning
Classifier Acc TP FN TN FP CI
1-NN 97.21 97 3 97.5 2.5 97.0785÷97.3565
3-NN 97.32 97.2 2.8 97.5 2.5 97.1890÷97.4618
CubicSVM 51.02 99.6 0.4 3 97 50.5976÷51.4428
DTNB 97.45 98.9 1.1 96 4 97.3225÷97.5887
J48 98.03 98.8 1.2 97.3 2.7 97.9186÷98.1532
Jrip 97.86 98.9 1.1 96.8 3.2 97.7407÷97.9851
LinearSVM 88.20 93.6 6.4 82.9 17.1 87.9372÷88.4824
NaiveBayes 89.68 99.7 0.3 79.7 20.3 89.4239÷89.9381
PART 98.06 99 1 97.2 2.8 97.9493÷98.1821
QuadraticSVM 83.63 90.9 9.1 76.4 23.6 83.3272÷83.9526
Random Forest 98.35 99.3 0.7 97.5 2.5 98.2503÷98.4651
Random Tree 97.56 97.7 2.3 97.4 2.6 97.4332÷97.6938
RBFNetwork 75.93 85.2 14.8 66.8 33.2 75.5766÷76.2992
RBFSVM 86.87 90.3 9.7 83.5 16.5 86.5908÷87.1616
Ridor 98.00 99.3 0.7 96.7 3.3 97.8899÷98.1261
SMO 88.19 93.5 6.5 82.9 17.1 87.9259÷88.4713
Table 5.5: Percentage of Acc, TP , FN , TN , FP , and CI for Acc by varying
the applied Classifier
the percentage of True Positives (and, in consequence, close to 1% concerning
the percentage of False Negatives) but not all of them provide also satisfying
results in terms of True Negatives and False Positives. In this view, from the
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results reported in Table 5.5, it is possible to individuate the most promising
classifiers. To this goal we use the metric in Equation (5.2) that minimizes
the sum of the percentage of False Positives and False Negatives.
min(FP + FN) (5.2)
The resulting three best classifiers are: Random Forest, J48, and PART.
5.4.3 Classifier Performance to distinguish Single Mal-
ware affected flows and Normal Traffic
The ability of the selected classifiers to correctly detect each single malware
has been also checked. Given the training phase operated to get the results
in Table 5.5, we have tested the three classifiers by using the 50% of the
traces of each malware (which contains, as said before, both affected and
not affected packets) not used for training. The performance in terms of
Acc, TP, FN, TN, and FP (as well as the 95% Confidence Interval of the
Accuracy) is shown in Tables 5.6, 5.7, and 5.8, for J48, PART, and Ran-
dom Forest respectively. All selected classifiers offer excellent performance
even if Random Forest is slightly more efficient. It perfectly distinguishes
Kuluoz, Tbot, and ZeroAccess from Normal Traffic (100% Accuracy) and,
in particular, provides an Accuracy of 97.78% for Cutwail. J48 and PART
get for the same malware an Accuracy of 91.48% and 90.46%, respectively.
The performance of Random Forest is again the best for Purplehaze: 99.95%
against 98.53% of J48 and 93.42% of PART. Concerning Zeus, Random For-
est and J48 allow getting an Accuracy of 99%, PART of about 94%. The
performance for AlienspyRAT and Ramnit is the same for all the considered
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J48
Malware Acc TP FN TN FP CI
AlienspyRAT 99.83 100 0 75 25 99.5127÷100
Cutwail 91.48 100 0 81.7 18.3 89.8853÷93.0789
Kuluoz 99.98 100 0 99.5 0.5 99.965÷100
Purplehaze 98.53 98.9 1.1 88 12 98.1416÷98.9196
Ramnit 96.74 100 0 68.8 31.2 96.4364÷97.0566
Sality 99.56 99.6 0.4 99.6 0.4 99.4072÷99.7272
Tbot 99.10 100 0 99.1 0.9 97.3649÷100
ZeroAccess 98.28 98.2 1.8 100 0 96.3625÷100
Zeus 99.00 100 0 98.5 1.5 97.0789÷100
Table 5.6: Percentage of Acc, TP , FN , TN , FP , and CI for Acc using J48
Classifier
classifiers as well as, substantially, for Sality.
5.4.4 Classifiers Acting in Parallel
A possible alternative to the use of a single classifier is the exploitation of a
bank of classifiers as shown in the Packet Analyzer in Figure 5.2. Specifically,
a group of different classifiers act in parallel and communicate their decisions
to one Decision Maker (DM) block.
The DM block can make the final decision about malware affection or not
in different ways. It can state that a flow is malware affected either if at
least one single classifier has taken this decision (Dominant), or following
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PART
Malware Acc TP FN TN FP CI
AlienspyRAT 99.83 100 0 75 25 99.5127÷100
Cutwail 90.46 97.8 2.2 82.1 17.9 88.7796÷92.1404
Kuluoz 99.94 99.9 0.1 100 0 99.8889÷99.9927
Purplehaze 93.41 93.4 6.6 94 6 92.6131÷94.2169
Ramnit 96.74 100 0 68.8 31.2 96.4364÷97.0566
Sality 99.35 98.7 1.3 99.7 0.3 99.1552÷99.5466
Tbot 99.10 80 20 100 0 97.3649÷100
ZeroAccess 98.85 98.8 1.2 100 0 97.2822÷100
Zeus 94.05 94.1 5.9 94 6 89.4493÷98.6695
Table 5.7: Percentage of Acc, TP , FN , TN , FP , and CI for Acc using
PART Classifier
the majority of the decisions of the single classifiers (Majority), or if all
single classifiers have taken this decision (Unanimity). The three classifiers
selected before (J48, PART, and Random Forest) have been used to compose
the mentioned bank of classifiers acting in parallel. The results about Accu-
racy, TP, FN, TN and FP are reported in Table 5.9 together with the 95%
Confidence Interval of the Accuracy. Training and testing files are the same
as in Subsection 5.4.2. Even if the reported percentage are very similar for
all the DMs, some remarks may be made. The “Dominant” DM maximizes
the percentage of True Positives (and consequently minimizes the percent-
age of False Negatives) with respect to both the other two DMs (and this
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Random Forest
Malware Acc TP FN TN FP CI
AlienspyRAT 99.83 100 0 75 25 99.5127÷100
Cutwail 97.78 99.5 0.5 95.8 4.2 96.9435÷98.6271
Kuluoz 100 100 0 100 0 100÷100
Purplehaze 99.94 99.9 0.1 100 0 99.8702÷100
Ramnit 96.73 100 0 68.8 31.2 96.428÷97.049
Sality 99.79 99.8 0.2 99.8 0.2 99.69÷99.9082
Tbot 100 100 0 100 0 100÷100
ZeroAccess 100 100 0 100 0 100÷100
Zeus 99.00 100 0 98.5 1.5 97.0789÷100
Table 5.8: Percentage of Acc, TP , FN , TN , FP , and CI for Acc using
Random Forest Classifier
is expected) and the most performant classifier Random Forest (see Table
5.5) that assures TP and FN equal to 99.3% and 0.7% respectively. The
same quantities for the “Dominant” DM are 99.69% and 0.31%. Even if the
difference is not evident, the very slight improvement means that there is an
intervention of J48 and PART that detect malware affection when Random
Forest (rarely) fails. The improvement in terms of TP and FN is paid by a
worst performance concerning TN and FP. The decrease of TN happens not
only with respect to the other DMs (again expected) but with respect to the
values got by Random Forest in Table 5.5.
Increasing the necessary number of malware decisions made by single
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DM Strategy Acc TP FN TN FP CI
Dominant 98.28 99.68 0.32 96.89 3.11 98.1735÷98.3931
Majority 98.28 99.25 0.75 97.33 2.67 98.1754÷98.3949
Unanimity 97.88 98.04 1.96 97.73 2.27 97.7637÷98.0069
Table 5.9: Percentage of Acc, TP , FN , TN , FP , and CI for Acc obtained
at the output of the three DMs
classifiers to assign a flow to the malware class allows reducing the percent-
age of False Positives (2.67% for “Majority” and 2.27% for “Unanimity”)
and, consequently, increasing the percentage of True Negatives (97.33% and
97.73%, respectively for “Majority” and “Unanimity”) at cost of FN and
TP. Similarly as happens for “Dominant” about TP and FN, “Unanimity”
allows getting TN and FP values better than the ones got by Random Forest
in Table 5.5, again for the intervention of J48 and PART which mitigate the
rare erroneous decisions of Random Forest.
5.5 Considerations
In this research we propose a network-based IDS called SF-IDS (Statistical
Fingerprint - IDS) devoted to decide whether an IP flow is malware-affected
or not. SF-IDS is structured into a training phase and a classification/
decision phase. Both phases are based on the definition and extraction of
a group of IP flows statistical parameters that represent the Statistical Fin-
gerprint. The key idea is that the Statistical Fingerprint may help detecting
the nature (malicious or not) of each flow. The classification/decision phase
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consists of a “Feature Extractor” (FE), a bank of classifiers, and a Decision
Maker that merges the decisions of the classifiers. The performance evalua-
tion traces a possible streamline in view of a future practical implementation
and it is structured as follows.
1) Evaluation of the single classifiers and choice of the best ones. To
perform this choice we have adopted as a metric the sum of False Alarms and
Missed Detections and we have selected the schemes providing the minimum
values. Random Forest is the best one but also J48 and PART provide
excellent results. The selected schemes are very efficient even if applied to
each single malware. In particular, Random Forest assures a null percentage
of False Negatives and False Positives for Kuluoz, Tbot, and ZeroAccess,
and a very close to null percentage for Sality and Zeus. Random Forest
also assures satisfying results for Cutwail. It is very efficient to recognize
AlienspyRAT and Ramnit (100% TP - 0% FN ) but it has some difficulties
to identify normal traffic, often interpreted as these malwares (75% TN -
25% FP for AlienspyRAT and 68.8% TN - 31.2% for Ramnit).
2) Evaluation of the scheme including three classifiers (Random Forest,
J48, and PART acting in parallel) and a Decision Maker (DM) that makes
decisions on the basis of three different strategies: “Dominant”, “Majority”,
and “Unanimity”.
The choice among the three DMs depends on a possibly adopted risk
function/performance tuning. For example, in this case, the balance be-
tween Missed Detections and False Alarms we want to get: the “Dominant”
DM allows minimizing Missed Detections at cost of False Alarms; increasing
the number of algorithms necessary to classify a flow as a malware allows
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achieving better results in terms of False Alarms but implies a performance
decrease as concerns Missed Detections. The minimum percentage of False
Alarms is got by “Unanimity” DM.
The obtained results open the door to an actual development of the soft-
ware needed to implement the overall architecture proposed here that will be
discussed in the next chapter. For this implementation we chose to use the




The number of people accessing the Internet is growing rapidly leading, on
one hand, to new possible attacks used by cyber criminals and, on the other
hand, to an increased complexity in the network management. It is cru-
cial designing systems able to prevent cyber attacks. At the same time,
many efforts are provided in order to get tools that can make easier net-
work management. The Software Defined Networking (SDN) paradigm has
been designed with this aim allowing network administrators to manage net-
works easily. This chapter deals with an original Intrusion Detection System
that exploits an SDN architecture to get the information needed to feed a
statistical-fingerprint based IDS. Specifically the proposed system collects
traffic data suitable to detect the possible presence of malware inside the
network, and describes the design and implementation of an application de-
veloped upon a SDN controller (Ryu) and its role in the malware detection
process.
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6.1 Introduction
IDSs [75] may be classified depending on: data source (host based, network
based, and hybrid); detection time (on and off line); environment (wireless,
wired, and heterogeneous); architecture type (centralized/distributed); reac-
tion (active/passive); and processing (Misuse Detection and Anomaly Detec-
tion). We focus the attention on reactive network based systems, possibly
operating online over heterogeneous networks. In parallel with the evolution
of IDSs, the need of simplifying network management has brought to the de-
velopment of the Software Defined Networking (SDN) [119, 120] paradigm.
Combining a malware detector IDS and SDN may represent a step forward
in the service provided by SDN and may allow simplifying the IDS design by
means of SDN functions.
6.2 State of The Art
Although the solution proposed in [121] is not directly linked to malware
detection, it introduces a possible approach for collecting flow statistics in
SDN. The author explains that the use of SDN is essential to allow deep accu-
racy and granularity without introducing too much communication overhead
inside the network. SDN is able to control both temporal (how often to col-
lect data) and spatial (how deep should the inspection be inside the packet)
granularity and to distribute flow counting tasks in a smart way among all
the switches in the network.
In [122], the authors design an environment that exploits SDN to im-
plement an IDS for a network of Embedded Mobile Devices, so avoiding
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the problems of standard IDSs within this kind of network such as the in-
ability to cope with end-host mobility and the limited set of actions which
can be taken in response to anomalies. Without specifying any particular
anomaly detection algorithm, the authors classify what kind of anomalies
can be observed: Stateless Flow, Stateful Flow, Volumetric Anomalies, and
Physical Anomalies. Within this classification, the category closer to our ap-
proach is the volumetric anomaly, which is revealed from the statistics sent
by the switches to the controller. However, the reference [122] focuses on
the changes of the overall traffic volume, whereas we consider more specific
statistical features of flows.
The authors of [123] propose a behavioral-based Security Monitoring Sys-
tem that exploits the flexibility of SDN to orchestrate the detection system.
The used controller is Ryu but the collection of statistical data and the classi-
fication of flows are delegated to sFlow that represents an additional element
in the network. The used classifier in [123] is SVM, a supervised classification
algorithm in line with our design choice.
In [124] a DDoS detector is implemented by SDN to allow recognizing ma-
licious flows without any deep packet inspection. The system architecture
is similar to the one proposed in this chapter, even though some differences
arise, mainly concerning the classification phase. [124] chooses NOX as a
controller and develops an application that collects flows’ statistics at prede-
termined time instants. 6 features are extracted from the collected statistics.
Self Organizing Map (SOM), an unsupervised classifier, is employed for flow
classification.
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6.3 SDN Controller Employed within an IDS
6.3.1 General Description of Ryu
The controller chosen to implement our IDS is Ryu [125], an open source,
component-based, software defined networking framework written in python,
which provides software components by using API that make easy for devel-
opers to create new network management and control applications. The
general structure of the code is sketched in Figure 6.1 that highlights how
the main central framework, responsible for the whole system management,
communicates with the switches through the OpenFlow protocol and with















Figure 6.1: Ryu scheme
The main contribution is the design and implementation of an application
(app) called stats manager, aimed at managing the flow tables in the used
SDN switch, providing the information needed to classify the traffic, and
making decisions about “malware/normal” on the examined traffic.
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6.3.2 Flow Structure
A traffic flow is usually defined as a group of packets sharing some common
characteristics. We use one of the most common conventions according to
which a flow is a set of packets having the same 5-tuple: IP source address,
IP destination address, TCP/UDP source port, TCP/UDP destination port,
Protocol field of IP header. For each flow we store the data in Table 6.1.
Key Description
IP src IP source address
port src TCP/UDP source port
IP dst IP destination address
port dst TCP/UDP destination port
protocol Protocol field in the IP header
first len length of the first packet
pkt count number of packets in the flow
byte count number of bytes in the flow
dur sec duration of the flow(in seconds)
dur nsec nanoseconds exceeding dur sec
byte rate byte rate of the flow
pkt rate packet rate of the flow
avg iat average inter-arrival time between packets
avg pl average packet length
state current state of the flow
extra p number of packets not registered in the statistics
extra b number of bytes not registered in the statistics
label class of the flow (’normal’ or ’virus’)
Table 6.1: Flow Dictionary Structure
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The first 5 lines define the flow; the following 9 lines contain the features
selected in the previous chapter, which can be computed by the SDN con-
troller directly from the information received by the SDN switch through the
statistic reply message; last four lines are better explained in the following:
• state: describes the state of each flow with respect to the current time
window (see section 6.3.3):
– ’B’ means “begun”
– ’C’ means “continued”
– ’E’ means “ended”
• extra p and extra b: some packets such as the packet-in, i.e. the first
packet of a new flow, and corresponding bytes cannot be considered by
the SDN switch counters. In other words they cannot be detected by
using the statistic reply message. These fields allow the app not to lose
this information. These aspects will be elaborated in the following.
• label: it is the ground truth about the nature of the flow: normal
or affected by malware. During the training phase this information is
used to give correct examples to the classifier. In the test phase this
field is ignored by the classifier and it is used only to assess the system
performance.
Data related to a single flow are stored in the application by two struc-
tures: active flows, which contains all the flows currently active in the
network, and ended flows, which maintains the information about the flows
recently terminated.
CHAPTER 6. SDN IDS IMPLEMENTATION 132



























































































Figure 6.2: General picture of how the app interacts with Ryu
Being Ryu an event-based controller, developing an application for this
framework means coding functions that will be executed when a particular
event happens. Figure 6.2 depicts the most relevant events for our goal
(denoted with a star) and their temporal action. In detail:
1) Initialization: this event happens only when the controller instance
is created, all the internal variables are initialized, and the monitor
thread, which will periodically trigger the statistics’ request, is started.
The controller periodically sends a flow statistic request message in or-
der to gather information about the network traffic from all the switches
in the network (just the used one in our case). The time period elapsed
between two consecutive messages is called time window and it was
empirically set to 30 seconds.
2) Feature Reply: shortly after the boot, the controller needs to collect
some information about the network it has to control. To this purpose it
sends a feature request message to the connected switch that, in turn,
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answer through a feature reply message, announcing what optional
features it supports. Being the first communication between controller
and switch, the initialization of flow tables occurs.
3) Packet-in: the first packet of a new flow doesn’t match any rule in the
flow tables, thus it is sent directly to the controller where two kinds
of actions are performed: standard packet-in management and start
of the IDS statistics collection. The former relates to the tasks that
are usually done by every SDN controller: the path for the new flow
is computed, the needed rules are installed in the switch, and the first
packet is sent back to the sender switch encapsulated in a packet-out
message. The latter is strictly related to “Stats Manager” application:
the unknown flow must be recorded in the active flows database and
the length of the first packet (first len in Table 6.1) is stored.
4) Flow removed: if no packet matches a given rule for a specified num-
ber of seconds, called idle timeout, the flow is considered ended and the
rule is removed from the table. When this occurs, the switch sends a
packet to the controller, containing the statistics of the removed rule, to
notify the event. This is the asynchronous way to collect statistics be-
cause it may happen at any time instant, as it is strictly dependent on
the traffic. The controller extracts the flow identifiers and uses them
as indexes to retrieve the specific flow in the active flows database.
The measured features (pkt count, byte count, dur sec, dur nsec, in
Table 6.1) are immediately saved and the derived features (byte rate,
pkt rate, avg iat, avg pl) inferred from the previous ones through sim-
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ple processing. Finally, the flow entry is removed from the active flow
database and inserted in the ended flow database.
5) Flow stats Reply: as stated before, every 30 seconds the controller
asks the switch for the statistics of the currently active flows. As a
reply, the switch sends an OpenFlow packet containing the statistics of
all the flows to the controller, as illustrated in Figure 6.3. This is the
synchronous way to collect statistics since it is regularly scheduled by
the controller. Similarly to the asynchronous case, every flow identifier
is used as an index to look for the flow entry in the active flows database.
Once found, the entry is updated with the new data, before being stored
again.
Figure 6.3: Flow Stats Reply
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Upon flow stat replies are received at the end of a time window additional






Figure 6.4: Classification Process
All the data related to both active and ended flows are merged to form
a unique dataset. The subsequent processing steps depend on the phase the
controller is actually performing.
• Training Phase: received data are added to the training set of the
classifier; when enough data are gathered, they are used to train the
classifier. This process produces the classifier’s model as a result, which
is stored and used in the test phase.
• Test Phase: received data are directly addressed to a classifier’s module
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for the actual classification. Even though the output of a single flow
classification is just a binary label stating ”malware“ or ”normal“, the
system produces two different text files as output.
The first one contains the details of all the analyzed flows and reports
all the fields of the flow structure, in Table 6.1, together with the result
of the classification process. Consequently it is possible to check how
the classifier performs for each single flow.
The second file contains a general report for every time window, con-
taining the total number of flows, the number of normal and malware
flows, and the usual classification metrics: true positives, true nega-
tives, false positives, false negatives.
6.4 Used Traffic
In order to test our approach we have to collect traffic information abut
malwares. The traces used in this research with the purpose of verifying the
proposed architecture, are composed by a mix of different traffic generated
by different malwares, which are briefly described in the following:
AlienspyRat: it belongs to the Remote Access Trojan family. Once
activated, this software allows collecting system information, updating and
downloading other malware. The malware sends captured information to the
central server and waits to receive commands.
Asprox: is a spam botnet emerged in 2007. It is known for sending mass
of phishing emails used in conjunction with social engineering lures (e.g.,
booking confirmations, postal-themed spam, etc.). This botnet arrives as
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an attachment to spammed messages disguised as notifications from postal
companies, as well as airline booking confirmations.
Cutwail: is a botnet used to generate spam emails using the contacts
in address books. The malware receives instructions from a command and
control server about which and how many messages to send. Once it has
completed the task, it sends a full report on the number of sent messages
and on any found errors to the controller.
Darkness: also called Optima, it is a botnet specialized in DDoS attacks.
It waits for commands from a Command and Control (C&C) server that sends
encrypted control messages to the infected machines.
Kuluoz: is a botnet aimed at sending phishing emails that simulate mes-
sages sent by postal administrations, combined with the use of social engi-
neering techniques. Furthermore, the control server is able to send commands
to the infected machines to download and execute pay-per-install programs
so to ensure gains to the botnet manager.
Madness: is a distributed denial of service botnet growing in size and
popularity. It infects computers running Windows and communicates with
its command and control server via HTTP by using a simple client-server
model.
Neris: is a botnet that uses an http-based channel to communicate with
the C&C server. The main aims of this malware, after establishing a commu-
nication with the C&C, are to send spam and perform click-fraud by using
advertisement services.
Purplehaze: is a botnet targeted to take the control of machines with
the aim of using them to generate many clicks on online advertising sites. It
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can generate a high volume of traffic on web sites containing advertisements
or links in very short time.
Ramnit: this trojan primarily spreads through a contact with infected
removable devices, mainly USB flash memory. Once installed, this program
connects with a remote server via TCP port 443, sending all the obtained
information on the infected machine.
Tbot: is a Trojan that targets older Windows versions in order to open
a back door in the system and allow the attacker to use the machine without
the owner’s consent.
ZeroAccess: this Trojan has the main purpose of assuring money to the
attacker via pay-per-click advertisement. This tool is able to create a hidden
and encrypted file system where it can save its members in total freedom, as
well as all other additional malware that can download.
Zeus: has the main purpose of stealing information related to the bank
accounts of the targets by means of techniques such as man-in the-browser,
keystroke logging and form grabbing. The spread of the virus occurs mainly
through drive-by downloads, initiated by mistake from the user, or phishing
schemes. There is a server that acts as a control center from which the
commands start.
6.5 Testbed and Scenario Setup
6.5.1 The network
The network is emulated by means of mininet [126], an open source program
which allows recreating a realistic virtual network inside a pc. More precisely,







Figure 6.5: Network topology
it is a network emulation orchestration system that runs a collection of end-
hosts, switches, routers, and links on a single Linux kernel. It uses lightweight
virtualization to make a single system look like a complete network.
Mininet supports the SDN paradigm by implementing its main compo-
nents: the switches and controller. Regarding switches, mininet leverages
Open v-Switch [37], an open source, multilayer virtual switch, explicitly
designed to enable network automation through programmatic extensions,
while still supporting standard management interfaces and protocols.
Concerning the controller, mininet implements the basic OpenFlow refer-
ence controller by default but it is possible to specify which controller to use
at launch time. In our work we set as SDN controller the instance of Ryu
that contains the stats manager app running on the same machine that
emulates the network.
The chosen network topology to perform the simulations is sketched in
Figure 6.5. It consists of two hosts (h1 and h2) connected to a single SDN
switch (S1) that communicate with the SDN controller (C1) through a ded-
icated channel.
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6.5.2 Traffic emulation
In order to emulate a real scenario, we merged the flows produced by the
malwares described in Section 6.4 with normal, malware-free traffic. We
have captured normal flows by setting a network switch in our laboratory in
port monitoring mode and sniffing all the traffic coming to the switch. Before
starting the actual transmission, some manipulations on the original captured
flows are performed with the help of the Tcpreplay [127] and Wireshark [128]
command line tools:
• IP addresses was rewritten in such a way that all the packets appear
to be exchanged between only two IP addresses: 10.0.0.1 and 10.0.0.2.
• In order to keep the simulation time reasonable, we cut the longest
traces in order to have the same duration for normal and malware
traffic. The duration of our experiments was approximately 2 hours.
• We divided the 12 malware’s captures in 2 groups of 6 and added
one malware-free capture to each group. In particular, group 1 con-
tained Asprox, Cutwail, Darkness, Madness, Purplehaze, and Zeus;
while group 2 contained Alienspy, Kuluoz, Neris, Ramnit, Tbot, and
Zeroaccess.
• All the captured flows of both groups were temporally shifted in order
to begin at the same time instant. Finally, they were merged together
in two final pcap files to be used in the emulations.
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6.5.3 The Classifier
Ensemble learning algorithms (e.g., random forest, bagging and boosting)
have received an increasing interest because they are more accurate and ro-
bust to noise and outliers than single classifiers [129]. The philosophy behind
ensembles classifiers is that a set of classifiers performs better than an in-
dividual classifier. [88] introduced a new and promising classifier in 2001
called Random Forest that consists of a collection of tree-structured classi-
fiers, each one initialized with an independent identically distributed random
vector x. Random Forest presents many advantages: it runs efficiently on
large databases, it is able to handle thousands of input variables without vari-
able deletion, it is computationally lighter than other tree ensemble methods.
Moreover, Random Forest estimates which variables are more important in
the classification.
We performed a classifier performance evaluation in the previous chapter
and Random Forest provided the best performance, for this reason, it has
been also used also in the following tests.
When a sample is given as input to the classifier every tree independently
decides the class of the samples Ĉb(x) and casts a unit vote for it. The most
voted class is the final output of the classifier ĈBrf = mojorityvote{Ĉb(x)}B1 .
The implementation of the classifier in python language is taken from the
scikit-learn library [130], whose APIs are inserted into Ryu’s code through a
wrapper class we wrote for this purpose.
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6.6 Performance evaluation and comments
Table 6.2 presents the overall results related to the two groups of malware
described in Section 6.4. When group 2 is tested, group 1 is used in the train-
ing phase and viceversa, as shown in Table 6.2. The indicated values refer to
the percentages of the parameters True Positive (TP), True Negative (TN),
False Positive (FP), False Negative (FN), and Accuracy (ACC, computed as
TP+TN
TF
, where TF is the total number of flows).
Sim Train Test TP TN FP FN ACC
1 group 1 group 2 0.845 0.987 0.013 0.155 0.887
2 group 2 group 1 0.978 0.964 0.036 0.022 0.972
Table 6.2: Results of the Simulations
In this particular application, since the result of the flows’ classification is
available for each time window, we computed an overall value for the afore-

































• t is a counter of the time window when the classification takes place.
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• T is the last time instant of the simulation.
• TPt is the number of TP at instant t.
• Fmt is the number of malware flows at instant t.
• F nt is the number of normal flows at instant t.
• F Tt is the total number flows at instant t.
Figure 6.6: ROC Diagram of Simulation 1
Figures 6.6 and 6.7 show the Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curves
of the two simulations in Table 6.2. The dashed line is the “line of no
discrimination” given by a random guess. The graphs show a performance
very close to the ideal one (point (0, 1)) in both figures. It means that our
designed system reaches a very high value of correct detections (TP) with a
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Figure 6.7: ROC Diagram of Simulation 2
very low probability of false alarms (FP). It is worth remarking that, in both
cases, the classifier is trained with a set of malware flows which is different
from the one employed in the testing phase, i.e. the malware used to test the
classifier is not part of the dataset used to build the model for the Random
Forest algorithm during the training phase.
The implementation of a combined malware detector IDS and SDN sys-
tem allows simplifying the IDS design also improving the service offered by
an SDN architecture. In this chapter we presented a possible implementa-
tion of an integrated SDN-IDS Ryu-based controller application devoted to
detect the possible presence of malwares traversing the network. The results
obtained through a simulation campaign have demonstrated the effectiveness
and robustness of the proposed system, which has reached an accuracy level
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ranging from 88 and 97%.
This is a little step forward in the use of an SDN approach that can lead
to innovative solutions to manage and secure networks.
Chapter 7
Conclusions
In the first part of this work we analyzed and explained the most important
benefits and improvements that SDN architecture provided to traditional
networking approaches. The main innovation brought by SDN is the decou-
pling of control plane and data plane. In SDN the two tasks are assigned
to different entities: the controller, which is the part of the network ded-
icated to compute the forwarding state and the switch, which is the node
devoted to packet forwarding based on the local forwarding state. Then,
we described the concept behind Quality of Service and we illustrated the
most common approaches used in traditional networks to assure specific per-
formance requirements. The previous considerations allowed to understand
the importance of Quality of Service in priority-based networks and its ben-
efits in emerging applications. For this reason we analyzed the OpenFlow
protocol and the basic tools it provides to support QoS solutions. Due to
the lack of flexibility and power of the tools mentioned above, we decided
to propose new approaches to manage priority flows inside a SDN network,
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exploiting the re-routing principle. The solutions introduced by our work
are the Deadline algorithm, in which priority flows are assigned to the least
loaded queue, and the Dedicated strategy, in which each queue of the SDN
switch is devoted to a specific type of traffic. Moreover we developed several
load balancing algorithms to the purpose of equalizing the traffic among the
queues of a SDN node. Our cases of study show that the proposed QoS solu-
tions allow to gain satisfying results when applied to the current OpenFlow
environment. Future developments could consist in testing the network en-
vironment with a larger amount of traffic in order to test the scalability of
our solutions. Furthermore, we plan to run our algorithms in other scenar-
ios set with different queue configurations. We will investigate alternative
QoS strategies that could lead to further improvements in performances. We
also plan to develop an extension of our internal re-routing approach to the
computation of alternative paths between source and destination, in order to
leverage the network congestion.
After the discussion on the QoS support in a SDN network we focus our
attention on the satellite environment. This implies to take into account
the limitations and the possible advantages brought by this world. One of
them is the fact that traditionally current operating satellite communication
networks rely on ad-hoc hardware components and proprietary software so-
lutions. This hinders the integration of satellite and terrestrial networks and
also of different satellite networks. Fortunately, new solutions are arising
to ease the integration and allow satellites to be part of an overall Internet
composed of heterogeneous networks, according to the network evolution en-
visioned in the 5G environment. SDN is one of them but its employment in
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satellite networks is not straightforward. In this work we try to understand
which is the current employments of this technology in the satellite environ-
ment surveying the outputs of some the main research projects and studies
about the integration of satellite networks in the 5G environment, propos-
ing a possible road-map for the introduction of the SDN and virtualization
concepts in the next generation satellite - terrestrial networks and proposing
a model to estimate the mean time required to complete the SDN control
actions and to deliver the first packet of a new traffic flow able to give and
idea of the delay introduced by the use of SDN in satellite communications.
Finally, we discussed about the network security and in particular we fo-
cused on the intrusion detection systems, which are systems aimed at analyz-
ing and detecting security problems. The first part of the chapter is devoted
to IDSs based on the taxonomy related to these systems. More precisely, we
discussed on the differences between Misuse and Anomaly Detection based
IDSs. Then we concentrate our attention on statistical fingerprint-based in-
trusion detection systems, which inspects packets in order to get a statistical
characterization of the flows. This characterization represents their finger-
print and based on this our system makes decisions regarding the flow under
analysis. More in detail, we extract a specific flow fingerprint able to tell us if
the considered flow is affected by malware or not. For this purpose, we used
different machine learning algorithms, which take as input the aforemen-
tioned fingerprint and release as output the category of the analyzed flow.
After this we investigated if it was feasible to apply this technique also in
the SDN environment. To this purpose, using the knowledge acquired during
the entire research, we built an SDN controller application able to manage
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both the traffic traversing the network and, in the same time, identify if a
considered flow is affected by malware or not. Both of these actions can be
done by the used SDN controller Ryu without any OpenFlow modification,
resulting 100% compliant with the current specifications.
This research is not intended finished but, on the contrary, there are a
lot of things to do in the SDN field. A possible future work, which is in
direct sequence with this thesis, can be understand what are the implication
regarding the next generation (5G) networks, not only in the satellite en-
vironment, as done in this work, but also in the other fields treated inside
this thesis. One possible example is the study of the implication of SDN
in the support of quality of service in terrestrial 5G environment. An other
interesting field of study in which SDN can play a major role, it is applying
its concepts to industrial networks. Nowadays, industries and in particular
the energy production environment are trying to open their network to the
internet and the infrastructure remote control is becoming a must. In this
transformation SDN can play a primary role due to its flexibility and easier
management.
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